So many people have asked me to get writing again, so i will try, but first I would like to release in public an article that has been waiting for publication for several years. You may remember several years back when I posted a series on treating gentile patients on Shabbat. During the last few years I have expanded on the subject and it developed into a full fledged article, which I believe is very important and I would like to release it.
Several scholarly journals have expressed an interest in publishing it, but since I am still anonymous, many were unwilling to do so. However, as this article has anonymously made its rounds among the various Orthodox Journals, it has already spawned some level of opposition. So I have the dubious distinction of having my detractors already publish responses to my ideas even before my ideas have seen the light of day.
In the spirit of Lehagdil Torah, I will now release the article, and I encourage all of you to disseminate it in whatever forums you believe are appropriate. If anyone would like a pdf version, or Word version of the article sent to them by email, feel free to send me an email and I would be happy to provide. I hope you enjoy it.
So here it is:
In this article I intend to address one of the most difficult
dilemmas that I have had with my faith and belief system as a Jew. Equal rights and equal treatment for all
people, regardless of race, religion etc. is a value that is the basis of the
society within which we live and function.
As a physician, this value is brought to life in a very real and
practical way every day and every moment of my career. To treat everyone equally with compassion
and concern is the basic value which drives any caring physician to provide
care as equitably and as justly as possible.
As a Shabbat-observant Jewish physician, this value becomes
especially important when caring for my patients on Shabbat. Trying to maintain the proper reverence for
the special mitzvah of Shabbat, while at the same time doing things usually
prohibited on Shabbat, is not an easy task.
However, there is no question that on Shabbat, a physician must treat his/her
patients with the same compassion, energy and concern that one has on an
ordinary weekday.
We are all familiar with the accepted Halachic practice that
for matters pertaining to life and death, one must violate the rules of Shabbat
to save life. This is true regardless of
the patient’s age, race, gender, or religion.
However, I believe that it is also crucial to understand the background
and rationale behind this practice. This
is where the problem begins, and this led me to the need to write this article.
The problem is one that I have discussed on many occasions with
many fellow Orthodox Jewish physicians from virtually all sectors of Orthodox
Jewish society, and it relates to the rationale for the treatment of non-Jewish
patients on Shabbat. My numerous
conversations over the years have led me to be quite certain that I am far from
alone when I express my concern regarding this matter. I almost consistently get the same or similar
response when the topic comes up. The
following is an almost direct quote from a learned Orthodox physician (not sure
if this matters, but it may interest some of the readers that this physician is
one who most certainly would self-identify with the “yeshivish-Chareidi”
version of Orthodoxy) whom I met recently while shopping for groceries. “It simply can’t be that the Ribbono Shel
Olam doesn’t want me to treat the goy on Shabbos just like I treat a Jew,” he
said, “I know what the seforim say, but I know that there must be another
explanation. The seforim don’t reflect
what I know the Torah really wants.”
What is the problem this physician was referring to? The problem is as follows: According to virtually all mainstream Halachic
authorities, Shabbat is to be violated to save a life, and that includes any
human life, whether Jew or gentile [1]. However, according to these authorities, the rationale for saving a non-Jewish
versus a Jewish life is very differ rent. The Jewish life must be saved because
the Halacha requires it, and we will discuss the details of this rule very
soon. However, the gentile life must be saved for a different reason entirely.
Briefly, the reason that the modern Halachic authorities agree that we are
obligated to violate Shabbat for any life on the Shabbat, is because any other
approach would be devastating to our relations with the gentile world, and
would arouse such hatred to Jews that it would pose a real threat to Jewish
life. For the remainder of this
article, I will use the Hebrew term “Eyvah” to describe the concept that allows
one to do otherwise prohibited acts on Shabbat due to the fear of raising
hatred among the gentiles.
It has always bothered me, that while the act of caring for
the gentile patient is absolutely permitted and encouraged, as it clearly
should be, the reasoning behind this principle seems very deeply flawed. Is this really the value system that I
believe in? Is this really what the Torah wants me to believe? I have always
found this to be very hard to accept, and that is why I am writing this article[2].
This issue is a particularly timely one. We need to face this honestly, and we need to
face it directly. For starters, I sincerely believe, just like my friend the
Chareidi doctor believes, that there must be another valid Torah approach to
this issue. However, in addition to the
personal angst caused by the prevalent approach to fellow Jews, there are two important
reasons why we need to face this issue now.
The first is very practical. Everything we say and do as Halachic
Jews is scrutinized and judged by the rest of the internet-connected,
news-frenzied, blog-inundated world.
Indeed, R’ Moshe Feinstein understood this problem when regarding the
specific topic of this article he wrote[3]:
“…and certainly when one considers
the immediate publication of the news of what happens across the entire world
by the newspapers, there is certainly a problem that one place will learn from
another and a terrible incitement can occur where hatred (towards the Jews)
will occur and result in terrible persecution and murder (of Jews) it is
therefore clear that in our times this is considered a real danger (and
therefore it is permitted to treat non-Jews) …”
… If only he knew how prophetic his words were,
which were written before the internet, cable news programs, and blogs were
even invented.
In case you are naïve enough to think that we can keep Halachic
discussion within the “dalet Amot Shel Halachah” and out of the hands of the
anti-Semites, allow me to bring several examples that should frighten you into
reality. The most recent one just hit
the press around May 17, 2012, with the screaming headline: “Rabbi Yosef:
Treating gentiles Violates Sabbath”[4].
Within hours of R’ Yosef’s Hilchot Shabbat shiur, anti-Semitic websites were
having a heyday with this clear evidence of a prominent rabbi and his obvious
discrimination against non-Jews. Who
knows what kind of negative repercussions such statements will have in the
future?
Probably the most famous such episode in the last century
was the Dr. Israel Shahak affair. Dr.
Shahak was a Hebrew university professor who wrote a letter in the December
1965 Haaretz alleging Orthodox discrimination against non-Jews. One of his primary allegations was that
Orthodox Jews would not treat a gentile patient on the Sabbath. This sparked a huge controversy, with many rabbis
countering his claims[5].
Israel Shahak is still the darling of the anti-Semitic world, having gained
much fame in numerous anti-Semitic forums on the world-wide web, as any Google
search would reveal.
A third recent example was sparked by an article by Noah
Feldman in the NY Times magazine in July 2007[6].
Feldman openly discusses his personal struggle with the double standards
implicit in this Halachah. This also
generated an internet fueled media fury, and its repercussions are still
reverberating throughout the world.
So practically speaking, we as Halachic Jews cannot afford to
ignore this important issue. If we
ignore it, we may cause real physical danger to ourselves and the Jewish people
in general.
However, the second reason why this is so important, is
because of the implicit moral values that one derives from these Halachot. One can definitely argue that the Halachah is
at its core a legal system and not a set of moral principles. Therefore, one
might say that it doesn’t really matter why
we permit the violation of Shabbat to save the life of a gentile; the bottom
line is that it is permitted. However, I do not believe that this is adequate
at all.
As Orthodox Jews we profess that the Halachah is a God-given
set of rules by which we are supposed to lead our lives. It is therefore inescapable that the rules,
and this includes the rationale behind the rules, have moral implications. It
is hard to imagine that God would give us a set of immoral and unjust laws to
live by! Today’s “medical ethics” literature is constantly blurring the line
between law and ethics in areas such as patient autonomy, preservation of life,
and abortion. Try to find an article
about the Halachot of end of life issues without also finding a reference to
the reverence of the Halachah for life, or an article about the Halachot of
abortion without a reference to the sanctity of the human being, or a
discussion of patient autonomy in Jewish law without numerous references to our
moral obligation to take care of our own God-given bodies. As an avid reader of
this body of literature, I am quite certain that you will come up
empty-handed. It would seem obvious to
anyone even slightly familiar with Halachah that the laws are meant to teach
and preserve a higher ethical and moral ideal.
So what then are we to make of the fact that the Torah seems
to only allow the violation of the Sabbath to save a Jewish life and not a
gentile life? It is true that the authorities
today permit the violation of Shabbat to treat a gentile on Shabbat. On a practical level this may somewhat
alleviate the first problem, but it does nothing to help us with the second
problem. We are still stuck with the
unfortunate impression that according to the Torah, the life of a gentile is
not important enough to trump the laws of Shabbat.
I am going to propose in this article a completely different
and Halachically valid approach. Let us begin by analyzing the primary sources
and the approach of most Halachic authorities to date.
The Talmud in Avodah Zara[7]
says:
"Rav Yosef thought to say that
for a Jew (midwife) to deliver an idol worshiper’s baby on Shabbat for pay
should be permitted due to eyvah (a fear of causing hatred among non-Jews
towards Jews) Abaye responded, “She can say to her - for us that keep Shabbat
we can desecrate Shabbat, but for you who do not keep Shabbat we do not
desecrate Shabbat".
The issues relevant to our discussion in this passage can be
summarized as follows:
1)
It seems that the conclusion of the Talmud is
that one is NOT allowed to treat gentiles on Shabbat because of Abaye's
statement that there is no Eyvah. Can one argue that in modern times this
"explanation" of Abaye won't work anymore, if so, does R' Yosef's
reason for leniency, the fear of Eyvah, still apply?
2)
If Rav Yosef's leniency due to Eyvah does apply nowadays,
regarding what level of severity of prohibitions does it apply? There are three
possibilities.
a)
It could be that Eyvah cannot supersede ANY
prohibition, not even a Rabbinic decree. If this is true, then Rav Yosef
only meant that Eyvah allows one to treat a gentile at all. This would be
because the Talmud elsewhere prohibits a Jew from treating a gentile who
worships idols. If this is true, R’ Yosef's permission was only meant to
permit transgressing this specific decree.
If so, he never meant to permit treating a gentile on Shabbat in a way
that would violate the laws of Shabbat.
b)
Alternatively, it could be that Eyvah is only
meant to permit transgressing prohibitions of Rabbinic origin, but not
prohibitions of D’Oraytah origin
c)
Or, it could be that Eyvah can even allow
transgressing a prohibition of D’Oraytah origin on Shabbat.
The following is a review of
some of the major commentaries and their opinions:
1)
Ritva[8]
and Ran[9]
take the position that the concept of
Eyvah cannot even allow the transgression of a Rabbinic prohibition.
According to this opinion, the entire concept of eyvah was only used by Rav
Yosef to allow the treatment of a gentile in general, but not if it involved
the transgression of the Shabbat at all, as in other places the Talmud taught
that a Jew should not treat an idol worshipper. R’ Yosef Karo in the Beit Yosef[10]
brings a famous argument between Ramban and Rashba vs. Rabbeinu Yonah regarding
the permissibility of giving infertility treatments to a gentile. Ramban
and Rashba allowed it due to Eyvah, whereas Rabbeinu Yonah was very
critical. It would seem that the argument revolved around whether or not
the concept of Eyvah applies nowadays to allow the treatment of a gentile in
general. Ramban, Rashba, Ran, and Ritva
would have allowed it due to Eyvah, while Rabbeinu Yonah would not allow it,
presumably because of Abaye’s objection. However, none of these authorities
felt that eyvah would allow the transgression of an actual prohibition, even a Rabbinic
prohibition. This is also the position taken by the Shulchan Aruch and the
Mishna Berura[11].
2)
Tosfot[12] say that the concept of eyvah would permit
someone to transgress a Rabbinic prohibition but not a D’Oraytah
prohibition. Many authorities take this position including the Tosfot
Shabbat[13].
3)
No authority seriously entertains the
possibility that eyvah would allow transgressing a D’Oraytah prohibition.
However, several authorities, including the Maharik[14],
and the Tiferet Yisrael[15]
cleverly use the concept of Eyvah to allow transgressing a D’Oraytah
prohibition through an interesting "Halachic trick". They use
the following argument. Since the Jew is only transgressing the
prohibition because he is afraid of causing
hatred (eyvah), he is not doing it because he actually needs to work done for
himself. That would make the act that he is doing fit the Halachic category of
a “melacha she'aynah tz'richa l'gufa” (work that is done for a purpose OTHER
than accomplishing the work itself). Therefore it is not really a D’Oraytah
prohibition, rather it is a Rabbinic prohibition, and therefore it can be done
due to the concept of Eyvah.
4)
A detailed analysis of the opinion of Rambam
regarding this sugyah is to be found in the appendix A to this article
Contemporary Halachah – the
“Mainstream Approach”
The modern Halachic authorities invariably bring the sources
that we just reviewed and use them as the basis for practical
Halachah. One of the most important
authorities often quoted is the Chatam Sofer[16]
who in a classic responsum allows transgressing even a D’Oraytah prohibition to
take care of a non-Jewish patient when there is reason to be concerned that the
Jew's life would be in danger if he does not treat the gentile. This is
what I like to call "Super-Eyvah" (as we are not just worried about
causing hatred, but we are also worried about an actual threat to a Jewish
life). Another important authority is the Divrei Chaim,[17] who writes, "It is the custom of
(Jewish) doctors to transgress D’Oraytah prohibitions on Shabbat. And I heard
that it was a decree of the Council of Four Lands that allowed them to do
this." The obvious question is, how could the Council decide to allow
transgressing a D’Oraytah prohibition by decree? The answers given to this
problem include (among others) the clever explanation of the Maharik[18],
or the explanation of the Chatam Sofer of "super-eyvah"[19].
The Mishna Berura[20] however, clearly disagrees with the Chatam Sofer and Divrei Chaim. In a famous remark, he sharply criticizes Jewish doctors who transgress the Shabbat to take care of non-Jewish patients. He writes, "They are completely intentional transgressors of the Shabbat (mechallelei Shabbat gemurim hem b'mazid) May God protect us!"
Nonetheless, virtually all modern authorities agree[21] that when push comes to shove, a Jewish physician can violate even a D’Oraytah prohibition to save a non-Jewish life. They come to this conclusion using some combination of the Chatam Sofer, Maharik, and Divrei Chaim and the principles of Eyvah, super-Eyvah, and melachah she’aynah tzerichah legufah. Each authority has his own stipulations etc... but the bottom line is about the same. Their advice is generally, try not to be there on Shabbat, but do what needs to be done regardless of the religion of the patient. Almost all authorities maintain, that for the purpose of the safety of the Jewish people, it is important that Jewish doctors violate the Shabbat to save a life, regardless of whether the patient is a Jew or a gentile.
The Mishna Berura[20] however, clearly disagrees with the Chatam Sofer and Divrei Chaim. In a famous remark, he sharply criticizes Jewish doctors who transgress the Shabbat to take care of non-Jewish patients. He writes, "They are completely intentional transgressors of the Shabbat (mechallelei Shabbat gemurim hem b'mazid) May God protect us!"
Nonetheless, virtually all modern authorities agree[21] that when push comes to shove, a Jewish physician can violate even a D’Oraytah prohibition to save a non-Jewish life. They come to this conclusion using some combination of the Chatam Sofer, Maharik, and Divrei Chaim and the principles of Eyvah, super-Eyvah, and melachah she’aynah tzerichah legufah. Each authority has his own stipulations etc... but the bottom line is about the same. Their advice is generally, try not to be there on Shabbat, but do what needs to be done regardless of the religion of the patient. Almost all authorities maintain, that for the purpose of the safety of the Jewish people, it is important that Jewish doctors violate the Shabbat to save a life, regardless of whether the patient is a Jew or a gentile.
Responding to the Charges
The aftermath of the Shahak affair led to the need for the Rabbinic
establishment to respond to the charges that the Halachah discriminated against
non-Jews. To summarize the general response of the rabbis, it is useful to
divide the answers into two categories. The first I will call the “darkhei
shalom” approach (DSA), and the second I will call the “challel Shabbat achat”
(CSA) approach.
The DSA can be described as follows. Although the Halachah might seem
discriminatory, the Torah also includes many areas that are non-Halachic, but
equally as important. For example, when
the Torah teaches us that we must act a certain ways because of “darkhei
shalom” (the ways of peace), then although it may not be Halachic, it is still
the teaching of the Torah. According to
this understanding, this can also be applied when something is allowed or even
required due to eyvah. The Torah is
essentially teaching us to act a certain way in order to decrease hatred, or
conversely, to increase love and peace[22].
The CSA can also be described as the emphasis on the
importance of Shabbat. This approach starts
with the assumption that in actuality, Shabbat is more important than saving
lives. This places Shabbat on the same
level as the three cardinal sins of murder, idolatry, and adultery, for which
one is required to give up one’s life.
This is something that even non-Jews may understand and is therefore a
religious value that is consistent, not a discriminatory value against any
particular group of people. However,
when one is faced with saving the life of a Jewish person who keeps the
Shabbat, one is only allowed to save his/her life due to the principle of
Challel Shabbat achat, K’dei Sheyishmor shabbatot Harbeh” (violate one Sabbath
so that he can keep many more in the future).
So by saving the life of the Jew, one is actually not violating Sabbath,
but preserving it. However, a non-Jew
will not keep the Sabbath in the future, and therefore his/her life would not be saved,
as the Sabbath is worth dying for.
The Letter of R’ Unterman
The chief advocate of both the CSA and the DSA was R’ Isser
Yehuda Unterman. Among the many
responses to the Shahak affair, Rav Unterman’s letter was the most prominent
and most frequently quoted of the Rabbinic responses, so I will mention it in
his name.
In Adar 5726 (March 1965) Rav Unterman published an article[23]
responding to the Shahak affair which consisted of both the DSA and the CSA
above. The first half of the article is
a strong defense of the general values of ethics of the Torah as expressed by
the principles of darkhei shalom. In the
second half of the article he describes why Shabbat really should not be
violated at all even to save lives, if not for the CSA principle. However, in today’s times, he quotes the
Chatam Sofer mentioned above, which supports the idea that since in our times
it would be a danger to Jewish lives not to save gentile lives on Shabbat, that
we must violate Shabbat for Jewish lives as well.
It is also worth mentioning the Lord Rabbi Immanuel
Jacobovits who wrote an article in the Tradition Journal[24]
which essentially reiterated Rav Unterman’s views. The most extensive and
thorough iteration of the CSA approach was an online article on the Shamash.org
website written by R’ Gil Student[25].
This approach was also taken by R’ Shlomo Aviner[26].
There are some obvious problems however with both the DSA
and CSA approaches to solving this dilemma.
The first issue is that we are still left with the uneasy feeling that
we started with. The advocates of this
approach have still not answered the essential charges of their detractors.
That is that the according to them, the Halachah still does distinguish between
the lives of Jews and gentiles regarding the violation of Shabbat. So if we were to accept their arguments, though
we might have mitigated the objections a little bit, the essential problem still
exists.
There are other problems with taking this approach, but a
full analysis would be quite lengthy and beyond the scope of this article. However,
I will briefly touch upon why I feel these approaches are not only inadequate
due to my “uneasiness”, but also present Halachic difficulties as well.
The Halachic problem with the CSA and DSA is that the simply
don’t reflect the conclusion of the Talmud.
At the conclusion of its’ discussion, the reason given for the obligation
to save lives on Shabbat is because of “vachay bahem” that the Mitzvot were
given to live by, not to die from their observance. This directly contradicts the claims of the
CSA advocates. After numerous possible
explanations for pikuach nefesh docheh Shabbat were proposed, Shmuel concludes
the Gemara as follows[27]:
“Says Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Shmuel, Had I been there, I would have said
that my explanation is better than theirs, “Vachay behem – One shall live by
them, not die by them. Says Rava: For all the other reasons there is a
disproof, except for the reason of Shmuel for which there is no disproof.”
The only reason quoted by Rif and Ran[28]
is the reason of Shmuel, the only reason quoted by Rashi in Sanhedrin . The
only reason according to Rosh[29]
is that of Shmuel, not any others. The Ramban whom we will quote later in this
article clearly states that the reason given by Shmuel is the reason we violate
Shabbat to save lives. Rambam as well, equates Shabbat with all other Mitzvot
that are violated when life is threatened, as he states[30],
“(the observance of) Shabbat is pushed away (dechuyah) when there is danger to
life, just like all other mitzvot.”
He is clearly trying to point out that life supersedes Shabbat, as he further
states clearly two stanzas later[31],
“One is prohibited from delaying the violation of the Shabbat when treating an
ill person who is endangered, as the Torah
states (the mitzvot) that people shall do and live by them, not die by them.”
The list of authorities who bring the reason of Shmuel as
the final reason for pikuach nefesh docheh Shabbat is very long, but suffice it
to say that the overwhelming majority of the poskim assume that we violate
Shabbat because of the supremacy of life, not because of CSA[32].
I would refer the reader to R’ Student’s article and the
other advocates of the CSA and DSA to see in detail what their defenses are
against the arguments I just presented above.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate an entirely different
approach, which assumes that saving lives does in principle supersede Shabbat,
as Shabbat is not one of the three sins for which one is supposed to give
his/her life.
A Different Halachic Approach – Meiri
So far, we are unfortunately left with the conclusion that
indeed, according to the letter of the law, one really should violate the
Shabbat only to save a Jewish life. Even
the saving of the gentile life is only permissible because one is indirectly
saving Jewish lives as well, as we are preventing the spread of anti-Semitic hatred of Jews. However, there is a different understanding
of the law, which I will describe in the remainder of this article. The basis
and starting point to understand this different
approach is the famous opinion of Meiri.
Many people who have studied Talmud in depth are familiar
with Meiri's opinions as they relate to the Halachic status of non-Jews.
However, the full extent of his opinions, and the extent to which many later authorities
have subscribed to his opinions is not well known. When I was exposed to Meiri
in yeshiva, I was under the impression that his words were just apologetics
that were meant to calm relations with the gentiles, but that in reality they
were not Halachically important and that they were not meant (even by Meiri
himself) to be taken seriously[33].
However, the truth is that Meiri's opinions are not apologetics at all, but they are a comprehensive and complete philosophy of how to understand the attitude of the entire Talmud and Halachah as it relates to the treatment of non-Jews.
However, the truth is that Meiri's opinions are not apologetics at all, but they are a comprehensive and complete philosophy of how to understand the attitude of the entire Talmud and Halachah as it relates to the treatment of non-Jews.
To summarize; according to Meiri, the contemporary gentiles
of his day (basically Muslims and Christians) are all considered "Baalei
haDat" - people of religion. Meiri considered these Baalei haDat to
be different from the non-Jews referred to by Chazal – as they were pagans
who had no religion at all (at least not what the Rabbis of the Talmud would
have considered a religion).
Meiri’s comments are extensive and spread throughout his commentary on the Talmud. For the sake of brevity, I chose to summarize his opinions in the following three categories. The quotations from Meiri that support each of these categories and all the assertions I attribute to Meiri, are to be found in the footnotes for those interested in reading Meiri’s own words. Please keep in mind that my footnotes, although they are thorough, only represent a small selection of Meiri’s words on each topic.
Meiri’s comments are extensive and spread throughout his commentary on the Talmud. For the sake of brevity, I chose to summarize his opinions in the following three categories. The quotations from Meiri that support each of these categories and all the assertions I attribute to Meiri, are to be found in the footnotes for those interested in reading Meiri’s own words. Please keep in mind that my footnotes, although they are thorough, only represent a small selection of Meiri’s words on each topic.
1)
The first category regards the laws of business
interaction with non-Jews. This refers mostly to things that are
prohibited due to fear that the gentile would use the profits for idol
worship. This category Meiri held did not apply at all to his
contemporary gentiles[34].
2)
The second category deals with all Halachic
distinctions between Jews and non-Jews. This includes the obligation to save a
non-Jewish life (including on Shabbat[35]),
the obligation to return his lost object[36],
the death penalty for killing a human being[37]
(which the Meiri held applied to non-Jews as well), to give him charity and
free gifts[38],
the laws of damages[39],
and many more such laws. In this category, the Meiri held that his
contemporary gentiles were equal to Jews on all levels.
3)
The third category deals with Halachot meant to
keep Jews from intermingling (and intermarrying) with gentiles. This
includes things like a Gentile's wine, milk, bread and so on. In these
Halachot, the Meiri did not distinguish between his contemporary gentiles, and
those that lived in the time of the Talmud[40].
Contrary to what is often claimed, Meiri’s opinions were far
from simple apologetics, as his comments are wide ranging and consistent
throughout his commentary on Shas. Repeatedly his points are emphasized
and reiterated, and he clearly developed his approach thoroughly and
comprehensively. For example, R’ Eliezer
Waldenberg writes in a letter[41]
that it is implausible to argue that his entire approach to an enormous portion
of the Talmud was simply constructed out of fear of the censors. He also
states that we should use the Meiri as a "Makor Beit Av" (roughly
translated as - "a primary conceptual building block" - my
translation) when considering questions for dealing with gentiles in our times.
To assume that it was simply fear of the censors that drove the Meiri to formulate his extensive theories will becomes less and less plausible as one studies his commentaries on the Talmud.
Much of my understanding of Meiri comes from a book called "Bein Torah leChochmah" by Moshe Halbertal. It is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in learning more about Meiri and his opinions[42].
Probably the most interesting finding of Halbertal's study, is how he describes the reasoning behind Meiri ‘s approach. It is clear from Meiri that he felt that anyone who did not have a "Dat" (religion)was certainly someone who would not be bound by basic morality and justice. Halbertal proves that according to the Meiri, a society of Ba'alei Dat (people of religion) is a society of morals and justice, whereas a society without "Darchei HaDat" is one that is evil and corrupt. This is a very important point, and it is one that we will come back to later. Any society that is moral and just according to the Meiri would have the same status as Jews regarding these types of laws. It is important to recognize that in the middle ages, most philosophers believed that religion was the basis of morality. Although today many philosophers might argue that a society can be atheistic and still moral, this was not an accepted position in the time of Meiri.
For example, Meiri goes as far as saying that those that are "gedurim beDarchei Hadat” (subjected to the laws of religion) would be considered "Im She'Itcha BeTorah uveMitzvot" (a people that is your kin in Torah and righteous ways). The Talmud derives[43] that one is only obligated to return the lost object of someone included in the verse,” lo Tonu Ish et Amito”[44] - Im She'Itcha B'Torah UVe'Mitzvot, which Meiri learns explicitly includes non-Jews; as opposed to learning that it is excluding them! (The logic is that anyone who observes the seven Noahide laws and lives a moral life, is considered a brother in keeping Torah and Mitzvot with the Jewish people.)
To assume that it was simply fear of the censors that drove the Meiri to formulate his extensive theories will becomes less and less plausible as one studies his commentaries on the Talmud.
Much of my understanding of Meiri comes from a book called "Bein Torah leChochmah" by Moshe Halbertal. It is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in learning more about Meiri and his opinions[42].
Probably the most interesting finding of Halbertal's study, is how he describes the reasoning behind Meiri ‘s approach. It is clear from Meiri that he felt that anyone who did not have a "Dat" (religion)was certainly someone who would not be bound by basic morality and justice. Halbertal proves that according to the Meiri, a society of Ba'alei Dat (people of religion) is a society of morals and justice, whereas a society without "Darchei HaDat" is one that is evil and corrupt. This is a very important point, and it is one that we will come back to later. Any society that is moral and just according to the Meiri would have the same status as Jews regarding these types of laws. It is important to recognize that in the middle ages, most philosophers believed that religion was the basis of morality. Although today many philosophers might argue that a society can be atheistic and still moral, this was not an accepted position in the time of Meiri.
For example, Meiri goes as far as saying that those that are "gedurim beDarchei Hadat” (subjected to the laws of religion) would be considered "Im She'Itcha BeTorah uveMitzvot" (a people that is your kin in Torah and righteous ways). The Talmud derives[43] that one is only obligated to return the lost object of someone included in the verse,” lo Tonu Ish et Amito”[44] - Im She'Itcha B'Torah UVe'Mitzvot, which Meiri learns explicitly includes non-Jews; as opposed to learning that it is excluding them! (The logic is that anyone who observes the seven Noahide laws and lives a moral life, is considered a brother in keeping Torah and Mitzvot with the Jewish people.)
The important lesson we learn from Meiri is that there is a Halachic
distinction between different types of gentiles. That is for gentiles who are moral and not
idol worshippers (which for Meiri an idol worshipper was synonymous with
someone who lacked morals) one may transgress Shabbat to save their life,
because they are gedurim bedarchei haDat, and thus they are not included in the
restrictions placed against amoral idol worshippers.
The Ger Toshav Approach
There are other Halachic authorities that have proposed
ideas that are very similar to the opinion of the Meiri, but with a little different
“twist”. The most common theme is to
apply the concept of a Ger Toshav to our modern day gentiles.
R’ Nachum Rabinovich[45]
deals with the question of what a Jewish Israeli soldier should do if he/she
confronts an enemy soldier wounded on the battlefield on Shabbat. He differentiates between an injured
terrorist and an ordinary non-Jewish soldier. According to R’ Rabinovich,
an ordinary non-Jew who is a Christian or Muslim would be considered a ger
toshav. He establishes in the responsum that there is a mitzvah to save
the life of a ger Toshav even on Shabbat, at the same level as there is a
mitzvah to save the life of a Jew.
R’ Rabinovich cites several important sources for his contention that a modern day Christian or Muslim is considered a ger toshav. First, he brings proof from Ramban[46] that saving the life of a ger Toshav would supersede Shabbos. He then brings R’ Tzvi Hersh Chajes (the "Maharatz Chajes"), who held that modern day Christians and Muslims have the status of Gerei Toshav[47]. According to R' Rabinovich, the terrorist would not be considered a ger Toshav, by virtue of the fact that he is not a moral human being. This is because a primary requirement to attain the status of Ger Toshav a gentile must accept to live by basic moral laws. Therefore the terrorist should only be saved on Shabbat due to Eyvah. An ordinary enemy soldier though, would be considered a Ger Toshav, and one must violate the Shabbat for him because saving his life supersedes the Shabbat.
This is a different angle then Meiri. According to Meiri, non-Jews who live in a moral and just society are considered “baalei dat” and we are therefore obligated to save their lives on Shabbat[48]. According to R' Rabinovich though, we save their lives due to the concept of Ger Toshav. Once we give contemporary gentiles the status of Gerei Toshav, we are obligated to save their lives on Shabbat in accordance with the opinion of Ramban (and other Rishonim as well, as we shall discuss later in this article).
R’ Rabinovich cites several important sources for his contention that a modern day Christian or Muslim is considered a ger toshav. First, he brings proof from Ramban[46] that saving the life of a ger Toshav would supersede Shabbos. He then brings R’ Tzvi Hersh Chajes (the "Maharatz Chajes"), who held that modern day Christians and Muslims have the status of Gerei Toshav[47]. According to R' Rabinovich, the terrorist would not be considered a ger Toshav, by virtue of the fact that he is not a moral human being. This is because a primary requirement to attain the status of Ger Toshav a gentile must accept to live by basic moral laws. Therefore the terrorist should only be saved on Shabbat due to Eyvah. An ordinary enemy soldier though, would be considered a Ger Toshav, and one must violate the Shabbat for him because saving his life supersedes the Shabbat.
This is a different angle then Meiri. According to Meiri, non-Jews who live in a moral and just society are considered “baalei dat” and we are therefore obligated to save their lives on Shabbat[48]. According to R' Rabinovich though, we save their lives due to the concept of Ger Toshav. Once we give contemporary gentiles the status of Gerei Toshav, we are obligated to save their lives on Shabbat in accordance with the opinion of Ramban (and other Rishonim as well, as we shall discuss later in this article).
R’ Rabinovich was not alone among modern poskim in his
contention that contemporary gentiles should be considered gerei toshav and
thus one should violate the Shabbat to save their lives. R’ Yehuda Gershuni [49]
also argues at length that contemporary gentiles should have the Halachah of
gerei Toshav and thus one should violate the Shabbat to save their lives. R’ Aryeh Leib Braude[50],
Rav of Lvov, Poland also presents the same argument. We will present summaries of some of their
most important arguments in the following discussion.
This teshuva of R’ Rabinovich opens up an entirely new idea
regarding saving the lives of gentiles on Shabbat. We will now examine this possibility in
depth. We will begin with R’ Rabinovich’s
assertion that one may violate Shabbat in order to save the life of a Ger
Toshav.
Pikuach Nefesh Docheh Shabbat, Can it
Really apply to a Ger Toshav?
The opinion of Ramban that saving the life of a Ger Toshav
supersedes Shabbat will strike many of the readers of this article as quite
revolutionary. Therefore I believe it is
important for us to analyze Ramban and where this assertion comes from, so that
the readers of this article have a deeper understanding of this opinion. I believe that this will also shed
significant light on our understanding of the opinion of Meiri as well, which
according to many authorities is based on the principle of Ger toshav, or
according to our analysis may be based on a different principle of “Gedurim
BeDarchei Hadatot”.
We will start with the following verse[51]:
“And if thy brother be waxen poor,
and his means fail with thee; then thou shalt uphold him: as a stranger and a
settler (Ger VeToshav Vachai Imach)
shall he live with thee”
“Take thou no interest of him or
increase; but fear thy God;(VeChai Achicha Imach) that thy brother may live
with thee.”
The Torat Kohanim (Sifra) on the first verse states as
follows:
“Ger – this refers to a ger tzedek
(a righteous full convert to Judaism), Toshav – this refers to a Ger that eats
(non-kosher slaughtered) carcasses (a common Rabbinic term for a ger toshav),
Vachai Imach – Your life precedes his life (chayecha Kodmin LeChayav)”
The Torat Kohanim (Sifra) on the second verse expounds
further in the meaning of “your life precedes his life”
“that thy brother may live with
thee - Ben Peturi explained this verse that if two people were travelling in
the desert and one of them has a jug of water, if one of them will drink it he
will make it to a settled place, but if they both share it and drink they will
both die of thirst, they should both drink it and die as it states “that thy
brother may live with thee” (this infers that people should live equally
together) Rabbi Akiva responded to him “that thy brother may live with thee” Your life precedes the life of your friend
(chayecha kodmin lechayei chaveircha)”
Ramban, in his Peirush al HaTorah on this verse, understands
this pasuk to be a specific “Mitzvat Aseh” – a positive commandment to save the
life of a fellow Jew, Ger Tzedek, and ger Toshav. In fact, according to Ramban, this is the
specific Mitzvat aseih of Pikuach Nefesh.
The following are the words of Ramban:
… “Vachai Imach” that he shall live
with you, this is a specific positive commandment to help him live, from this
verse we are commanded on (the mitzvah of) pikuach nefesh as a mitzvat aseih,
and using this verse chazal taught, “from here Ben Peturi explained that if two
people … (see above quote from the Sifra)” and then the Torah repeats and
states Vachai Achichah Imchah, to strengthen and warn us further of (the
importance of) this mitzvah …
Ramban then repeats this assertion in his commentary to
Rambam’s sefer HaMitzvot, where Ramban counts as Mitzvat Aseih # 16 this
mitzvah, in the following language:
“Mitzvah 16: That we are commanded
to support the life of a Ger Toshav, to save him from evil that may befall him,
that if he is drowning in a river or if he is buried under rubble that we
should try with all our energy to save him, and if he is ill, we should involve
ourselves in healing him. And certainly this also would apply to a fellow Jew
or a ger Tzeddek that we are also obligated to him in all of these matters. And
for them this is the pikuach nefesh which supersedes the Shabbat, as the pasuk
states “then thou shalt uphold him: as a stranger and a settler (Ger VeToshav
Vachai Imach) shall he live with thee…”
The Ramban’s intention is crystal clear, that the mitzvah of
Pikuach Nefesh which supersedes Shabbat is derived from this verse, and this
verse is referring to a Ger Toshav[52].
Rabbeinu Hillel[53],
also quotes this verse and understood that the verse vachai Imach is referring
to the mitzvah of pikuach nefesh for a Ger toshav. R’ Shimon b Tzemach Duran, also known as
Rashbatz[54]
also understood the verse this way, and writes clearly that this is a mitzvah
of Pikuach Nefesh for a ger Toshav that supersedes Shabbat.
So now we understand the Torah origin and Rabbinic origin of
this Halachah according to the Rishonim that we just mentioned.
As I suggested before, this may help us understand the basis
for Meiri’s position that those gentiles who are gedurim bedarchei hadattot
warrant chillul Shabbat to save their lives. As we have seen before, Meiri
understands the terms of the Torah such as “Reyachah, Akhicha, Amitecha” as including those who are “Gedurim
beDarchei Hadatot”, as opposed to excluding them[55]. It is therefore quite possible to suggest
that Meiri understood the verse “veChay Achicha imach” to be coming to include
all people in the category of “achicha “, meaning all those who are gedurim
bedarchei haDatot. This would be
consistent with Meiri’s opinions as we have found in other places.
So what then do the other Rishonim, do with the Torat
Kohanim we just mentioned? Fortunately, Ramban helps us out by explaining the
opinion of Rambam, which is likely the opinion of the majority of other
Rishonim who do not agree with Ramban on this point.
The conclusion of Ramban’s words that we quoted above is as
follows[56]:
“…But this Mitzvah (the mitzvah to
support the life of a Ger Toshav) the “Rav” (the Rambam) included in the
mitzvah of tzedakah (charity) which is mitzvah # 195 from the verse “and thou
shalt open your hand” but in truth they are two separate mitzvoth”
So the opinion of Rambam is clear, the mitzvah referred to
in this verse has nothing to do with pikuach nefesh at all, but rather it is a
mitzvah to support the life of a ger toshav by helping him, through charity,
loans, and other means of support.
However, it has nothing to do with Pikuach Nefesh. This is consistent with the Rambam’s words in
Hilchot Shabbat as follows[57]:
“…However, we do deliver the baby
of the daughter of a “ger toshav” because we are commanded to help him live
(“leHachayoto”) but we cannot violate the Shabbat even for her”
So Rambam clearly disagrees with Ramban on two counts. He disagrees regarding the special mitzvah of
pikuach nefesh for a ger Toshav, so he does not count it in his sefer
HaMitzvot, and he disagrees with Ramban’s assertion that this mitzvah would supersede
Shabbat.
Rashi in his comments on the same verse seems to agree with
Rambam, as he comments on the words “thou shalt uphold him (Vehechezakta bo)”
as follows[58]:
“Do not allow him to fall, but give
him strength at a time when he needs an outstretched hand, this can be compared
to a load on a donkey that is falling while it is still loaded on the donkey,
one hand can upright it and it will stay, but once it falls, five people
together may not be able to reload it”
Clearly, Rashi also understood that this mitzvah was
referring to charity, not to saving his life.
So we have established the basis of the machloket Rishonim
regarding saving the life of a Ger Toshav on Shabbat. The Rambam, Rashi, and most other Rishonim
seem to hold that it would not supersede the Shabbat, while Meiri, Ramban, Rashbatz,
and Rabbeinu Hillel would hold that saving the life of a ger Toshav would
supersede Shabbat.
Contemporary Gentiles, Can they have
the Halachic Status of a Ger Toshav?
In order to apply the principle of Ger Toshav to
contemporary gentiles, as R’ Rabinovich did in his teshuva, we need to overcome
a significant hurdle.
The Talmud states:
“Who is considered a Ger Toshav?
Anyone who accepts in front of three Chaveirim (a Halachic bet din) not to
worship idols” this is the opinion of R’ Meir, The Chachamim state “Anyone who
accepts upon himself to keep the seven mitzvoth that were accepted by the sons
of Noach”[59]
“The Ger Toshav is only done during
times when yovel is in effect”[60]
The obvious conclusion would be that the entire concept of
Ger Toshav cannot be applied to modern gentiles for two reasons. First because they never formally accepted in
front of a qualified bet din to keep the seven noahide laws, and second because
the Yovel is not kept in our times. This
is codified by Rambam[61],
and is accepted as practical Halachah. So how could we even discuss this
possibility, and how could R’ Rabinovich apply this concept to modern
gentiles? In the following discussion,
we will bring numerous authorities and opinions, and demonstrate how we can
apply the Ger Toshav concept even despite the lack of formal acceptance, and
despite the fact that Yovel is not in effect in contemporary times.
Maharal
R’ Yehuda Loewe of Prague, better known as the “Maharal”, in
his Be’er Hagolah[62]
writes a detailed response to those who claim that Chazal discriminate against
non-Jews. It is worthwhile for the
reader to read Maharal’s words in their entirety, as this sefer is readily
available to all. I will summarize here
his basic thesis, which is strikingly similar to that of Meiri in many ways.
Maharal divides humanity into three basic groups; Jews,
non-Jewish monotheists, and idol worshippers.
Maharal, like Meiri, claims that the discriminatory laws of Chazal
toward non-Jews only refer to those who do not keep the basic rules of
morality. Maharal equates those who are
not monotheists with those who lack basic morals. In this he also reflects Meiri’s belief that
morality is dependent upon the belief in one God. This is a common theme in medieval philosophy
in general and should not be surprising.
In reference to the second group of human beings, the monotheists (which
is clearly referring to his contemporary Christians), he applies all of the
rules of a Ger Toshav as follows[63]:
“…This second group includes the
remainder of people that are not of the Bnai Yisrael, that are not included in
the Torah of Moshe, but none-the-less they have not left the path to “flip the
plate upside down” and worship gods other than God Himself who is Everything, rather
they only worship the Primary Cause Unto whom Everything belongs…and when he
accepts upon himself to worship the Primary Cause he is called a Ger Toshav …
and this is mentioned in many places in the Torah …”
According to Maharal, all of the positive references in the
Talmud to non-Jews, such as those stating that the righteous gentiles merit the
world to come, refer to this monotheistic group, clearly referring to
Christians and Muslims. The Maharal,
similar to Meiri’s understanding of “Im sheitcha beTorah U’Vemitzvot”, learns
from the Torah’s language “re’ehu” roughly translated as “kin” or “friend” that
the Torah meant to include those who are also moral and ethical people, even
though they are not Jews. Here are Maharal’s words[64]:
“And behold those gentiles who
worship God have a partnership and togetherness with us as they also have One
God, this is the primary factor that binds them together (with us) and unites
them (with us) … Therefore the Torah states[65]
“and when the ox of one man gores the ox of his kin (re’ehu)…” The language
“re’ehu” connotes togetherness … and since they are friends together, they
should not damage one another, and they should pay each other for damages…
however, one who takes himself outside of the group to another side as he does
not worship The Creator of all things, rather he worships something else, he is
called by the Torah a “nochri” (stranger or gentile) and the Torah does not
obligate one to pay him (for damages)…”
Maharal slightly
veers from Meiri’s understanding when he equates the second group of
monotheists with the concept of the Ger Toshav.
Meiri never invoked this principle, but Maharal clearly understood that
his contemporary Christians and Muslims had the Halachic status of gerei
toshav. Although he extends all of the Halachic
privileges of Gerei toshav to his contemporary mono theists, he does not
explicitly state that one would violate the Shabbat to save their lives. He does however use the language
“She’metzuvah aleinu le’hachayoto” which is the same language that the Ramban
and the Rashbatz used in reference to the Ger Toshav when they permitted
violating the Shabbat to save his/her life.
Maharal though was not directly referring to Shabbat when he used that
language.
R’ Yechiel Heller
While discussing my ideas with some friends, someone brought
to my attention a teshuva written by the well-known R’ Yechiel Heller, author
of the Teshuvot Amudei Ohr[66].
Rav Heller’s essay is probably the most extensive treatment
of the subject from a renowned and respected posek, and he takes the same
position as Maharal, that contemporary monotheists have the Halachic status of
gerei toshav. R’ Heller during his
lengthy discussion goes through several steps.
- He establishes that when an entire community lives by the principles of the seven noahide laws and basic morality, that they have the status of Gerei Toshav[67] – even without a formal acceptance of the seven laws and even in modern times.
- He establishes that modern day Christians do keep the Noahide laws and basic morality (He establishes that even those who believe in the divinity of Jesus are guilty only of “shituf”, which is not one of the seven laws)
- He applies all of the positive references in Chazal to the righteous gentiles to modern day Christians, similar to Maharal
- He demonstrates that during the time of Chazal most nations were morally corrupt in addition to worshipping idols
- Interestingly, R’ Heller argues that Rambam also agreed that entire nations do not require a formal acceptance and would apply even today[68]
“…I also felt it appropriate to explain that which we often find in the words of our Rabbis in the Talmud, as in many places derived from the Torah’s words such as “Achicha” (your brother) and “amitecha” (your kin) and “re’echa” (your friend) that many of these languages exclude the idol worshipper. In all of this words it is obvious that they only meant to exclude the idol worshippers, who are evil and sin towards God and against the rest of humanity, as we explained, but a Ger Toshav, (such as those we are discussing) was never excluded from the category of “Achicha” and certainly not from the category of “Re’echa” (friend)…”
R’ Meir Dan Plotzki
Another authority who applies the laws and privileges of Ger
Toshav to all moral human beings who keep the seven Noahide laws is R’ Meir Dan
Plotzki. In his work Chemdas Yisrael, R’
Plotski establishes several important points:
- That any gentile who lives a life committed to keeping the seven Noahide laws is considered a Ger Toshav with all its privileges, even without a formal acceptance. This is because a formal acceptance is only necessary for those who have been idol worshippers and immoral, but now they want to repent and become a Ger Toshav. Only for such people is a formal acceptance necessary. However, someone who has never been an idol worshipper who has been keeping the seven noahide laws all of his/her life would have the Halachah of a Ger Toshav even without a formal acceptance.
- That even in our times, any gentile who keeps the seven laws is considered a Ger Toshav[70].
- That according to Ramban, saving the life of a Ger Toshav supersedes Shabbat, because of the positive commandment of “Le’hachayoto”[71]. R’ Plotski has a lengthy discussion regarding this opinion of Ramban. His discussion goes well beyond the scope of this article, but it is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in studying the Ramban in depth.
R’ Tzvi Hersh Chajes
R’ Tzvi Hersh Chajes also writes that modern Christians and
Muslims have the Halachic status of Gerei Toshav[72]. He also discusses at length why they don’t
require a formal acceptance of the Seven Noahide laws in front of a panel of
three. Unlike Maharal and R’ Heller who
learned that entire nations do not require a formal acceptance, and unlike R’
Plotski who held that a formal acceptance is only required of someone who once
was an idol worshipper, R’ Chajes had a different explanation[73].
According to R’ Chajes, anyone who keeps the seven Noahide
laws out of a tradition that he accepted from his ancestors, and that tradition
is based in a belief in monotheism and God-given laws, would be considered a
Ger Toshav. This tradition acts in place
of a formal acceptance. R’ Chajes argued that contemporary Christians and
Muslims do keep the basic laws of morality and monotheism precisely because of
such a tradition, and therefore they should be considered Gerei Toshav.
R’ Aryeh Leib Braude
The Maharal, R’ Heller, R’ Plotzki and R’ Chajes all laid
the foundation for the Halachic basis of considering contemporary gentiles to
be Halachic Gerei Toshav. However, they
did not make the explicit statement that we should therefore violate Shabbat to
save their lives. R’ Aryeh Leib Braude
was the first to explicitly state that this principle should practically apply
to contemporary gentiles, and that Jewish physicians should violate the Shabbat
to save gentile lives based on the principle of Ger Toshav.
In his sefer Mitzpeh Aryeh[74]
R’ Braude in a lengthy teshuva describes how we derive from the pasuk vechai
imakh the principle that pikuach nefesh supersedes Shabbat for all human
beings, even gentiles, as long as they are moral and keep “denim
u’mishpatim”. He essentially concludes
exactly like Meiri did, but never actually quotes Meiri. He does quote the Ramban though, and he
indicates that he is applying the same principle of Ger Toshav to all moral and
ethical gentile nations.
Rav Yehuda Gershuni
Rav Yehuda Gershuni gives perhaps the most thorough treatment
of this topic of all contemporary poskim, and it is worthwhile to summarize his
ideas[75]. His teshuva addresses three basic questions.
- Do contemporary Christians and Muslims have the Halachah of idol worshippers, or do they have the Halachah of a Ger Toshav (or some type of intermediate status)?
- Is it possible for the concept of Ger Toshav to apply in contemporary times?
- Does the command “Le’hachayoto” include only financial support of the Ger Toshav, or does it also include saving his life, and does that include violating Shabbat as well
To answer his first question, R’ Gershuni primarily relies
upon Meiri and R’ TH Chajes and brings many of the sources which we have
already discussed. He thus concludes
that contemporary monotheists would be considered either as gerei toshav, or as
Meiri describes them, gedurim bedarchei hadatot.
To answer his second question, he makes two interesting arguments. He begins by quoting an interesting language from the Ran:
“Although Bnei Noach are already warned (forbidden) to worship idols, because they are not careful to keep this rule, we require them to accept it (in front of bet din), therefore anyone who hasn’t formally accepted it is assumed to be an idol worshipper”[76
It seems clear that the Ran understood that the formal acceptance was only required because of the rampant nature of idol worship during the times of the Talmud. However, R’ Gershuni argues, when entire nations are adherent to religions that are not idol worship, such acceptance would not be required.
He then presents a lengthy discourse to prove that the concept of Ger Toshav actually does apply in contemporary times. However, it is only during the times of Yovel that we proactively accept such converts (“lechatchila”). Since these nations accepted it upon themselves, and this is as valid as a Bet Din, they therefore can still achieve that status on their own (“B’Dieved”).
In dealing with his third question, he brings the Ramban and
Meiri that support the notion that the mitzvah of Pikuach Nefesh applies to a
Ger toshav, even as it applies to violating Shabbat to save their life.
More on the Ger Toshav Approach
As we have seen, the differentiation between the Halachic
status of gentiles who are moral and keep the noahide laws, vs. those who are
immoral and do not keep the laws, has a long and well-established Halachic history. In order to lend further support to the
thesis of this article, I will briefly summarize several more prominent
authorities that should be mentioned.
R’ Dovid Tzvi Hoffman[77]
writes that contemporary gentiles (he is referring to Christians) are Halachically
considered Gerei Toshav. R’ SR Hirsch[78]
writes similar ideas in many places. While Rav Hirsch does not explore in
detail the practical Halachic ramifications of this approach, R’ Hoffman does invoke the clearly defined Halachic
category of Ger Toshav.
R’ Hirsch also discusses the commentary of R’ Yaakov Emden[79] , which strongly supports the argument that Christians and Muslims are moral and just and therefore should be considered Gerei Toshav. However, he does not actually take the plunge and explicitly write that they would have that Halachic status. His words are stirring though, and certainly offer our approach some strong backing. However, although it is possible that he would agree, I don't think there is enough evidence to claim that R’ Emden actually held that they would have the Halachic status of Gerei Toshav.
R’ Hirsch also discusses the commentary of R’ Yaakov Emden[79] , which strongly supports the argument that Christians and Muslims are moral and just and therefore should be considered Gerei Toshav. However, he does not actually take the plunge and explicitly write that they would have that Halachic status. His words are stirring though, and certainly offer our approach some strong backing. However, although it is possible that he would agree, I don't think there is enough evidence to claim that R’ Emden actually held that they would have the Halachic status of Gerei Toshav.
Many authorities argue that the actual basis of Meiri's
position is the principle of Ger Toshav.
However, especially after
Halbertal's study, it seems to me that this is not an accurate description of
Meiri’s opinion[80].
Prominent among the authorities who believed that Meiri’s opinion was based on
the principle of Ger Toshav was none other than R’ AY Kook[81].
R’ Kook utilizes an arresting choice of words, which lends
very strong support to our approach. In reference to the opinion of Meiri as
compared with the majority of other authorities, he uses the language
"HaIkkar K’HaMeiri" (“the “primary” or “correct” position is like the
Meiri”). R’ Kook clearly supports the opinion of Meiri for practical Halachic
practice that all societies that are just and moral are considered Geirei
Toshav. R’ Isaac Herzog takes this approach as well[82],
equating modern gentiles with Geirei Toshav.
R’ Ahron Soloveitchik[83], also invokes the Meiri when discussing treating gentiles in our time. He uses the Meiri to develop his approach that differentiates between gentile societies based on their morality and behavior. This is very similar to the approach of R' Rabinovich, and clearly R’ Soloveitchik was relying on the opinion of Meiri.
Another important authority who must be mentioned is the now famous remark of the Seridei Aish, R’ YY Weinberg[84], who stated in one of his letters to Professor Atlas that the opinion of the Meiri should be adopted as normative Halachah.
With our analysis so far, we have established a completely different Halachic basis from that found in the “mainstream” Halachic literature for the obligation to save the lives on non-Jews on Shabbat. We will assume that contemporary gentile society is moral and just, or in the words of the Meiri, “gedurim Bedarchei HaDatot venimusim”. We are therefore, according to Meiri, obligated to save their lives on Shabbat just as we are obligated to save the lives of Jews.
R’ Ahron Soloveitchik[83], also invokes the Meiri when discussing treating gentiles in our time. He uses the Meiri to develop his approach that differentiates between gentile societies based on their morality and behavior. This is very similar to the approach of R' Rabinovich, and clearly R’ Soloveitchik was relying on the opinion of Meiri.
Another important authority who must be mentioned is the now famous remark of the Seridei Aish, R’ YY Weinberg[84], who stated in one of his letters to Professor Atlas that the opinion of the Meiri should be adopted as normative Halachah.
With our analysis so far, we have established a completely different Halachic basis from that found in the “mainstream” Halachic literature for the obligation to save the lives on non-Jews on Shabbat. We will assume that contemporary gentile society is moral and just, or in the words of the Meiri, “gedurim Bedarchei HaDatot venimusim”. We are therefore, according to Meiri, obligated to save their lives on Shabbat just as we are obligated to save the lives of Jews.
Alternatively, we can assume that contemporary gentiles that
keep the seven noahide laws are considered Gerei Toshav, based on the other
authorities we have just reviewed. This
would follow the opinions of Maharal, R’ Heller, R’ Plotski, R’ Dovid Tzvi
Hoffman, R’ Kook, R’ Herzog, R’ YY Weinberg, R’ Ahron Soloveitchik, and R’
Rabinovich. If we then apply the opinions
of the Ramban, Rashbatz, Meiri, and Rabbeinu Hillel, one would be obligated to
violate the Shabbat in order to save the
life of a contemporary gentile.
What about Non-Christian and
Non-Muslim Gentiles?
We have thus far identified two basic approaches with which
many Halachic authorities differentiate between “our” modern gentiles and the
idol worshippers of the time of the Talmud. Both according to Meiri's opinion that gentiles are included in
"Im Sheitcha beTorah uveMitzvos”, or the approach of the other authorities
that they are considered gerei toshav, our obligation to save their lives is
dependent upon the fact that today's gentiles are part of a just and moral
society.
This leads to the following question. According to Meiri, a just and moral society is by definition a monotheistic society. According to the other authorities, to give a gentile the status of a ger toshav, he would need to keep the seven Noahide laws, including the Laws concerning idol worship. For the purpose of our discussion, we will assume that both Christianity and Islam are monotheistic religions. (The question of Christianity and idol worship is a major issue, but not one that we will deal with in detail in this article, as almost all of the authorities that we have mentioned until now do not consider Christianity to be idol worship, at least for gentiles. For some authorities, this is due to their understanding of Christianity itself[85]. For others, it is because belief in some other godly entity in addition to God Himself (i.e. Jesus) may not be prohibited for a non-Jew or some other rationale - otherwise known as “shituf”. Although this can be hotly debated, we cannot deny the fact that Meiri and the other authorities explicitly considered Christianity to be a monotheistic faith).
So what about Hindus, Buddhists, other religions, secularists, and indeed even outright atheists that may still believe in and live as a part of what we would otherwise consider to be moral and just societies? Can we desecrate the Shabbat to save their lives as well? After all, isn't belief in One God one of the seven basic Noahide Laws?
There are two ways we can deal with this issue.
For the first approach I must give credit to a very thorough article available online by Rabbi David Berger[86]. R’ Berger presents Moshe Halbertal’s analysis of Meiri and argues as follows. It is clear from Halbertal's study of Meiri that the reason why Meiri felt that monotheism was necessary in order to treat gentiles equally was because non-monotheistic societies were by definition corrupt and immoral. There are references in Meiri that suggest that he agreed that philosophers, even if they may not believe in God, may also be considered equal to Jews in the same way as monotheistic gentiles that do profess belief in monotheism. This would be true if their philosophical beliefs led them to lead moral and just lives[87].
It is important to recall that according to our understanding of Meiri, he did NOT base his opinion on the principal of Ger Toshav (despite the fact that many authorities might have understood the Meiri that way). The principal of Ger Toshav would require the gentile to accept the idea of One Deity. However, it is plausible, that Meiri would not have required monotheism for a gentile to get the privileges that he extended to monotheists. Let me reiterate, that Meiri did not believe that there could be such a thing as a society of simple masses that could be moral without a fundamental belief in a God that judges our actions and rewards and punishes our behavior accordingly. He did however allow for the possibility of individual philosophers that may lead moral lives despite a lack of a belief in monotheism. Had Meiri been aware of modern non-Monotheistic societies that are moral and just, it is entirely plausible that he would have considered them to be worthy of all the privileges that he extended to the Muslims and Christians of his time.
I admit that this may seem at first glance to be a bit of an unjustified stretch of the Meiri's opinion. However, R’ Berger brings some strong support for this idea from an essay by R’ Ahron Soloveitchik.
Let me quote from Rabbi Berger's article[88]:
This leads to the following question. According to Meiri, a just and moral society is by definition a monotheistic society. According to the other authorities, to give a gentile the status of a ger toshav, he would need to keep the seven Noahide laws, including the Laws concerning idol worship. For the purpose of our discussion, we will assume that both Christianity and Islam are monotheistic religions. (The question of Christianity and idol worship is a major issue, but not one that we will deal with in detail in this article, as almost all of the authorities that we have mentioned until now do not consider Christianity to be idol worship, at least for gentiles. For some authorities, this is due to their understanding of Christianity itself[85]. For others, it is because belief in some other godly entity in addition to God Himself (i.e. Jesus) may not be prohibited for a non-Jew or some other rationale - otherwise known as “shituf”. Although this can be hotly debated, we cannot deny the fact that Meiri and the other authorities explicitly considered Christianity to be a monotheistic faith).
So what about Hindus, Buddhists, other religions, secularists, and indeed even outright atheists that may still believe in and live as a part of what we would otherwise consider to be moral and just societies? Can we desecrate the Shabbat to save their lives as well? After all, isn't belief in One God one of the seven basic Noahide Laws?
There are two ways we can deal with this issue.
For the first approach I must give credit to a very thorough article available online by Rabbi David Berger[86]. R’ Berger presents Moshe Halbertal’s analysis of Meiri and argues as follows. It is clear from Halbertal's study of Meiri that the reason why Meiri felt that monotheism was necessary in order to treat gentiles equally was because non-monotheistic societies were by definition corrupt and immoral. There are references in Meiri that suggest that he agreed that philosophers, even if they may not believe in God, may also be considered equal to Jews in the same way as monotheistic gentiles that do profess belief in monotheism. This would be true if their philosophical beliefs led them to lead moral and just lives[87].
It is important to recall that according to our understanding of Meiri, he did NOT base his opinion on the principal of Ger Toshav (despite the fact that many authorities might have understood the Meiri that way). The principal of Ger Toshav would require the gentile to accept the idea of One Deity. However, it is plausible, that Meiri would not have required monotheism for a gentile to get the privileges that he extended to monotheists. Let me reiterate, that Meiri did not believe that there could be such a thing as a society of simple masses that could be moral without a fundamental belief in a God that judges our actions and rewards and punishes our behavior accordingly. He did however allow for the possibility of individual philosophers that may lead moral lives despite a lack of a belief in monotheism. Had Meiri been aware of modern non-Monotheistic societies that are moral and just, it is entirely plausible that he would have considered them to be worthy of all the privileges that he extended to the Muslims and Christians of his time.
I admit that this may seem at first glance to be a bit of an unjustified stretch of the Meiri's opinion. However, R’ Berger brings some strong support for this idea from an essay by R’ Ahron Soloveitchik.
Let me quote from Rabbi Berger's article[88]:
“The view that gentile behavior rather than theology determines how Jews should treat them is at least implicit in a relatively recent English essay by R. Ahron Soloveichik. He argues that love of other Jews must be blind, but love of gentiles, which he sees as an obligation expressed in the Rabbinic principle called “love of people” (ahavat ha-beriyyot), is grounded in the intellect and varies with the degree to which gentiles lead moral lives and treat Jews decently. This position is spelled out more rigorously in his novellae to Sefer ha-Madda. Here he maintains that the discriminatory laws against non-Jews result only from their status as evildoers (their shem rasha). Non-Jews who behave righteously by following the six Noahide laws other than the prohibition against avodah zarah are not considered evil as long as their theological error was inherited, as the Talmud suggests about pagans in the diaspora, from their parents and is thus considered inadvertent or even a result of compulsion. It is worth quoting more fully R. Jacob Emden’s application of this Talmudic dictum in a responsum to which R. Soloveichik alludes. “The Sages,” says the responsum, “declared, ‘The gentiles outside the Land of Israel are not worshippers of avodah zarah; rather, they follow the customs of their ancestors.’ Therefore their blood is precious in our eyes and would remain so even if we were ruling over them so that they were conquered under our control in our own land. After all, the Sages said—even with respect to full-fledged idolaters--that one does not lower them into a pit. How much more is this so in the diaspora where we take refuge under their protection; we are, then, obligated to protect them with all our ability and save them from death and from any loss or damage to the point where even guarding their money should be a labor of love."(all italics are my own)
Here we have
none other than R’ Ahron Soloveitchik saying exactly what we had just thought
might be too much of a stretch to attribute to Meiri. He clearly divorces
the requirement of the seventh of the Noahide laws, the requirement to believe
in One God from the equation necessary to be considered a good as opposed to an
evil person. According to R’ Soloveitchik, any gentile who is not evil,
whether or not he is a monotheist, warrants equal Halachic treatment.
This makes our approach to Meiri a more palatable and real.
Indeed, I do
believe that I can prove from the words of Meiri himself that he would have
agreed that even pagans who are not monotheists can be considered among the
“gedurim bedarchei haDat, and therefore would be accorded the same
privileges. In Avodah Zarah[89],
Meiri discusses the laws of gift giving to non-Jews. He brings a Tosefta[90]
which explicitly permits gift giving to a non-Jew who is one’s neighbor or
friend. The Meiri is apparently bothered
by the fact that in the days of the Talmud, this should have been prohibited,
as the gentiles of the time (at least the overwhelming majority of gentiles
with whom Chazal had contact) were “worshippers of the stars and
constellations” as we have seen throughout his writings. So in explanation of the Tosefta, the Meiri
writes that the Tosefta was referring to those gentiles in the
time of Chazal (R. Shimon ben Gamliel in this case) were gedurim beDarchei
haDat.
So Meiri
clearly understood, even in the days of the pagans, that some gentiles had
taken themselves out of the category of idol worshippers, and placed themselves
among the category of gedurim bedarchei haDat!
I don’t think anyone would reasonably claim that the Meiri thought R.
Shimon ben Gamliel was referring only to Christians and Moslems! Obviously
Meiri knew that the gentile neighbor or friend of R. Shimon ben Gamliel was
most likely a pagan!
This clearly
supports the claims we made in the name of R. Ahron Soloveitchik. That according to the Meiri, theological
belief in monotheism is NOT a prerequisite to deserving the privileges accorded
by Meiri to all moral and ethical people, regardless of their faith.
It also
supports the contention of Halbertal, that according to Meiri, religion is only
important because that is the only basis of a moral and ethical society. However, should such a society exist among
philosophers or even pagans, even without the belief in One God, then such
people would still be due the privileges of those who are “Gedurim beDarchei
haDat”.
In summary, according to this approach, any
society that is just and moral, even if the society is not based on monotheism,
would be considered equal to Jews and among other things, saving their lives
would be permitted on the Shabbat.
A second
possible approach would be that of R’ TH Chajes, the "Maharatz
Chajes". In his essay entitled Tiferes L'Yisrael he tackles this
problem in a different manner.
Remember
that R’ Chajes held that today's gentiles are considered Gerei toshav, and
therefore we are obligated to save their lives, even on Shabbat. But how
could someone who worships Avodah Zarah (assuming that the gentile were
non-Muslim and non-Christian – R’ Chajes explicitly does not consider
Christianity to be avodah zarah for a gentile) be considered a Ger
toshav? So R’ Chajes explains (my own translation):
"See Ramban in Parshas Acharei on the pasuk "VeLo Taki HaAretz...." who writes that [worship of other gods] in conjunction ("beshituf") for non-Jews was only prohibited within the land of Israel ... and see Mor Uketziah by the Gaon R Y' Emden OC 224 the "shituf" is permitted to non-Jews ...and according to my opinion, This is what Chazal meant when they stated in Chulin 13b "The non-Jews of outside Israel are worshipping "avodah zarah" in purity, as they are only following the customs of their forefathers (minhag avoseihem b'yedeihem") and see the Rambam in Peirush HaMishnayot first perek of Chulin on the Mishnah regarding ritual slaughter performed by a non-Jew who writes that there are two categories of Idol worshippers - those that are truly serving forms and talismans, and those that are simply following the customs of their forefathers ... and the intent of the Rambam is to say that [the second category of idol worshippers] truly intend to worship the God of Gods (Elokei Ha'elokim) but they simply mix into their worship other concepts..."
So according to R’ Chajes, most other religious people today
would really be considered monotheists for our purposes here, although they
themselves may mix other foreign concepts into their worship. I am not an
expert in comparative religion, so I do not know how far it is realistic to
extend this concept in contemporary times. However, this is another way
that this Halachic authority extended the privileges of gerei toshav to
all moral human societies.
If one carefully examines the words of R’ Y Emden that Rabbi Berger and R’ Soloveitchik cited, you will find that he seems to be endorsing the position of R’ Chajes, and he explicitly extends this to "full-fledged idolaters", and he applied the same principle of "minhag avoseihem b'yedeihem".
If one carefully examines the words of R’ Y Emden that Rabbi Berger and R’ Soloveitchik cited, you will find that he seems to be endorsing the position of R’ Chajes, and he explicitly extends this to "full-fledged idolaters", and he applied the same principle of "minhag avoseihem b'yedeihem".
Another simple way of explaining R’ Chajes’ opinion would be
to say that no society today is really an idol worshipper anymore. “Real” idol worship is thus a thing of the
past.
This approach leaves some lingering questions which I will
choose not to deal with. R’ Chajes
contention that no societies today are really idol worshippers can obviously be
rigorously contested. However, a full analysis of contemporary religious
practices and beliefs, which would be required to fully test R’ Chajes idea, is
well beyond the scope of this article.
In summary thus far, we have demonstrated a completely
different, but Halachically valid approach to the violation of the Shabbat laws
to treat patients. According to our
analysis, any human being who is a member of a just and moral society deserves
equal compassionate treatment, even on Shabbat, whether or not he/she is a Jew
or a gentile. Based on the understanding
of R’ Soloveitchik, R’ Chajes, and the other authorities we mentioned, there is
no questionnaire required to make sure the patient is a true monotheist.
In the unlikely event that a contemporary Orthodox physician
is confronted with the need to save someone’s life who is known to be immoral,
unjust, and not worthy of either the title of “Ger toshav” or “Ben Dat”, then
and only then does it become necessary to invoke the principle of eyvah. Such an example would be the suicide bomber
of R’ Rabinovitch’s discussion. He
clearly has demonstrated his immoral and unjust character, and he is clearly a
member of a society that is dedicated to murder and destruction. None the less he would still be saved on
Shabbat, but only because of eyvah, not because the laws of Shabbat are truly
suspended for his/her benefit.
In an article by Rabbi Dov Karrol[91],
he briefly touches upon the ideas expressed in this article, and he quotes, R’
Ahron Lichtenstein, as follows:
“My teacher and rosh yeshiva Rav Ahron Lichtenstein of Yeshivat Har Etzion explain to me that while the views that take the first approach (that treating a non-Jew is only permitted due to eyvah) address the practical issue, justifying saving the life of a gentile under certain conditions, they sidestep the fundamental issue. Rav Lichtenstein said that were he to be confronted with a case of violating Shabbat to save the life of a gentile, he would act to save the life of the gentile on principle, relying on those views that allow for it in principle, not based on societal concerns alone. Rav Lichtenstein also mentioned that his rebbe and father-in-law, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, ruled that this was permissible even in cases where there would be no problem of negative results, independent of such issues…”
This brings further support to our ideas, as according to R’
Lichtenstein, even in a hypothetical case where the principle of eyvah would
not apply (say for example if one is alone on a desert island with a gentile
and there is no possibility of negative repercussions) one would still be
obligated to violate the Shabbat to save the life of a gentile, not because it
is practical, but because it is Halachically the right thing to do.
Conclusion
There are several objections that I anticipate many will
have to my thesis.
The first objection is that my suggestion conflicts with the
opinion of the majority of the Halachic authorities, both the Rishonim and the
contemporary authorities. I freely admit
that this is true, as I said several times in the article. However, this issue is extremely important,
and numerous well known Rabbinic authorities have recognized the same issues
that I have raised. I believe that under
these circumstances it is necessary for us to rule in favor of the minority.
Another objection that some may raise is that I am guilty of
applying my modern egalitarian sensitivities to the Torah, instead of learning
from the Torah directly the values I should hold. Indeed, one may claim that I predetermined
what I believe, then searched the Torah for a justification of my beliefs. In a sense, we all must admit that we are
affected by our surroundings and the value systems of the societies within
which we live. The Meiri himself was
affected by the attitudes prevailing in medieval Provence[92],
but then so was Rabbeinu Yonah influenced by the extreme racial and religious
discrimination that was common in the society within which he lived. How are we
to judge between these influences to decide which one is right? We can only study the sources and do our best
to identify Torat Emet. That was my goal
in this study.
Some may claim that I still have not found full equality
among people of all kinds, as according to my thesis, people who are members of
corrupt and amoral societies would not warrant violation of Shabbat to save
their lives, if not for the concept of eyvah.
This still may not be acceptable to those who would argue that all
people are created equal … However, I
would counter that this itself a lesson of the Torah. All people DO have the right to life, and
that life supersedes the restrictions of Shabbat. However, should you choose to be immoral,
corrupt, violent, and choose to profess this as a way to live among others,
such as the suicide bomber of R’ Rabinovich’s responsum, then you have given up
that right to have your life saved on the Shabbat. That is a choice made by this particular
society, not a choice we as Jews have forced upon them.
Others may claim that all of the writings of Meiri and the
authorities I mentioned were simply apologetics, but deep down even they
believed that the Torah differentiates between the lives of Jews and gentiles
on Shabbat. I have already responded to
this claim several times regarding some of these authorities, but I would like
to add one more point. It is time for us
to follow in practice what R’ YY Weinberg and R’ Kook and the others told
us. It is time to take the Meiri and
those that followed him seriously as the foundation for modern Halachic
practice as it pertains to our relationships with gentiles. They told us this wise advice because they
knew it was time for this to happen, and we have waited too long to implement
their advice in practice.
Another objection I have heard was that these debates should
not be made public, and it is wrong to publish such articles in Journals that
are available online to the entire world.
They claim that the anti-Semites might pick up on these debates and
therefore the publication of this article will cause hatred against Jews. To this I respond that for precisely this
reason it is crucial that we publicize to all Jews what the Halachic attitude towards
gentiles is supposed to be.
Only by openly discussing these issues in these types of
forums will challenge all of us to seriously and honestly contemplate what our
true beliefs are regarding how we are supposed to relate to the rest of the
world.
I emphasized several times in the article that there are no
real practical implications of my ideas regarding the practice of caring for
gentile patients on Shabbat. As we
quoted from the great poskim of our generation, virtually all agree that a Jew
is obligated to save the life of a gentile on Shabbat, even if it involves a D’Oraytah
prohibition. However, I also realize
that the implications of my ideas are far reaching, and they potentially may
involve practical Halachic matters regarding how we relate to our gentile
neighbors. Even if there were no
practical implications, accepting my suggestions would certainly represent a
paradigm shift in the way Halachic Jews view the status of gentiles in
Halachah.
I have listed many leading Orthodox thinkers who either have
taken this step themselves, or at least considered it as a possible solution to
a difficult conundrum. However, I recognize
that I can only make suggestions, while the current Torah leadership needs to
determine if this is going to become a valid and accepted Halachic approach. To
the extent that the ideas I expressed may have some practical Halachic
ramifications, one should of course discuss such real situations with their Rav
before making decisions based on this article.
We all should be familiar with our God given mission to work
towards the goals so eloquently taught to us by our holy prophets. As Yeshayahu foretold, in Yeshayahu 2:3 “And
many peoples shall go and say: 'Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of
the LORD, to the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us of His ways,
and we will walk in His paths.' For out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the
word of the LORD from Jerusalem.” Think
for a moment, the goal of our entire existence as a people is to bring the message
of the Torah to the entire world. This
is where we are going, this is our holy mission. How then does the master of the universe want
us to treat all of His children? How
does he want us to teach the nations of the world to love and respect the God-given
Torah and the people of Israel who practice and live by its’ teachings? What attitude should we have towards our
neighbors? These are the thoughts I want
everyone to ponder, and I believe that at least some of the readers of this
article will understand how important it is that the Halachah we live by
reflects the true values of the Torah.
APPENDIX A
The following is an analysis of the opinion of Rambam
regarding the comments of Rav Yosef and Abaya in Avodah Zarah 26a. Rambam brings this Gemara in two places, in
Hilchot Avodah Zarah, and in Hilchot Shabbat.
In Hilchot Avodah Zarah[93]
he writes as follows:
“A Jewish Woman should not nurse
the child of a gentile because she is raising a child for idol worship, and she
should also not deliver a gentile baby. However, she can deliver the child for
pay because of eyvah”
In this chapter, Rambam is dealing specifically with
gentiles who are idol worshippers.
Rambam states unequivocally earlier in this same chapter that
contemporary Christians are considered idol worshippers [94]. One is therefore left to wonder exactly what
he held one should do in a similar situation involving Moslems, amongst whom
Rambam actually lived. It is well known that Rambam considered Islam to be a
monotheistic religion and not idol worshippers at all. Exactly how these rules
might apply to gentiles who are mono theists is somewhat unclear, as the
problem of raising child for idol worship ostensibly should not exist .
However, it is clear from the quote above that Rambam agreed
that the concept of eyvah was only meant to permit the delivery of an idol
worshipper’s child, but not in order to permit violation of Shabbat. This brings us to the second instance that
Rambam brings this Gemara, in Hilchot Shabbat[95].
“One may not deliver the baby of a
gentile on Shabbat, even for pay and we are not concerned with “eyvah” even if
there is no violation of Shabbat. However, we do deliver the baby of the
daughter of a “ger toshav” because we are commanded to help him live
(“leHachayoto”) but we cannot violate the Shabbat even for her.”
Rambam clearly holds that Abaye’s explanation of why we do
not deliver gentile babies on Shabbat would apply even in contemporary
times. Therefore eyvah would not be
applicable in our times at all when the delivery takes place on Shabbat. It is also certain that Rambam felt that one
cannot violate Shabbat to save the life of a Ger Toshav. But the words of Rambam require some
clarification. The problem is as
follows:
In Hilchot Avodah Zarah, it was clear that the reason one
may not deliver the baby of a gentile was because of the concern that one is
bringing into the world a child who will be an idol worshipper. However, if one is being paid for this
service then one is allowed to deliver the child due to Eyvah, so the concern
of raising an idol worshipper is overridden by eyvah. However, in Hilchot Shabbat, Rambam states
that one may not deliver such an infant on Shabbat as the concept of eyvah is
not a concern due to Abaye’s explanation.
The obvious inference is that although eyvah can supersede the
prohibition of delivering an idol worshipper’s baby, it cannot supersede the
transgression of Shabbat, due to Abaye’s explanation. If there was no
transgression of Shabbat, then Eyvah would apply, and one could deliver the
baby of an idol worshipper, due to eyvah.
But then Rambam states that on Shabbat one may deliver the
baby of a Ger Toshav, although not if it involves the violation of
Shabbat! If so, then exactly what is
Rambam permitting us to do for a Ger Toshav which was not already permitted for
an idol worshipper? On one hand, we cannot violate Shabbat either for a Ger
Toshav, or for a true idol worshipper. On the other hand, we can deliver the
baby of an idol worshipper when chillul Shabbat is not involved, and similarly we
can deliver the baby of the ger Toshav if chillul Shabbat is not involved, so
wherein lies the difference?
Therefore, one must understand that in the first statement
of Rambam, contrary to what is allowed by the ger toshav, for an idol
worshipper one is not even allowed to deliver their baby on Shabbat, even if it does not involve any violation of
Shabbat! So how then does Abaye’s explanation work, if there is no
violation of Shabbat, one cannot explain that we only violate Shabbat for those
that keep Shabbat, it is irrelevant!
One possible explanation, and it seems that this is how
Chazon Ish[96]
understood Rambam, is as follows: Rambam held like Tosfot that the concept of
Eyvah would allow transgression of Rabbinic prohibitions. Therefore, on a weekday, one may transgress
the Rabbinic prohibition of “bringing into the world an idol worshipper” due to
fear of eyvah. However, on Shabbat, if Rabbinic
prohibitions are involved one may not transgress them due to Eyvah because
Abaye’s explanation eliminates the concern for eyvah. According to Chazon Ish, Rambam agrees with Tosfot
that once the process of labor begins, the baby is considered “ne’ekar latzet”
and therefore no D’Oraytah prohibitions are incurred by delivering the
baby. These Rabbinic prohibitions then
DO NOT apply to a Ger Toshav, as we have the positive Torah commandment of
“Le”hachayoto” which supersedes the Rabbinic prohibition, so we are obligated
to deliver the baby of a Ger Toshav.
However, if it would involve a D’Oraytah
prohibition, we may not violate the
Shabbat for her.
Another understanding of Rambam is the Chatam Sofer[97].
Chatam Sofer understands that the reason why one may not deliver the baby of an
idol worshipper in Shabbat, despite the fear of eyvah, applies even where no Shabbat
transgressions occur at all. The Chatam
Sofer derived this from the words of the Maggid Mishna who stated that the
reason why she may not deliver the baby on Shabbat is because she can “slip out
of the situation (“lehishamet ve”lomar lah”)and state that there is Chillul Shabbat
here and therefore we only violate Shabbat for those who keep the Shabbat.”[98]
According to Chatam Sofer then, the conclusion of Rambam’s
words regarding a Ger Toshav, is simply meant to state that one should not
claim that chillul Shabbat is involved when it isn’t actually involved, as we
are obligated to help the Ger Toshav.
However, even Rabbinic
prohibitions would not be transgressed for a Ger Toshav.
This analysis may help us understand what Rambam might have
held regarding gentiles who are not idol worshippers. If the reason why one is
prohibited to treat a gentile is out of concern for the violation of a Rabbinic
prohibition associated with the delivery, as the Chazon Ish understood, then
Rambam in Hilchot Shabbat was not only referring to idol worshippers, he was
referring to ALL gentiles. Therefore,
one would conclude that as long as no chillul Shabbat was occurring at all
(even Rabbinic prohibitions), one may deliver the baby of a non-idol
worshipper, monotheistic gentile even on Shabbat. But if a Rabbinic prohibition were involved,
then one can only deliver the baby of a ger toshav (but no other gentile – even
a monotheist would have this leniency, unless one considers them a ger toshav),
because of the mitzvah of lahachayoto.
Whereas if a D’Oraytah prohibition was involved, one may not deliver any
gentile on Shabbat.
But if the reason why one may not treat the gentile on
Shabbat is out of concern for bringing an idol worshipper into the world, as
Chatam Sofer understood it, then this entire law would only apply to idol
worshippers. The ger Toshav’s baby
though, one would be allowed to deliver, because they are not idol
worshippers. Presumably, one could
deliver the baby of any monotheist as well. However, no violation of Shabbat
would be allowed at all, even Rabbinic prohibitions, as one can use Abaye’s
explanation.
In summary, Rambam’s opinion is as follows:
- One may not deliver the baby of an idol worshipper during the week, except for pay due to eyvah
- Chazon Ish - One may not deliver the baby of an idol worshipper on Shabbat if one is transgressing a Rabbinic decree, and one cannot apply the concept of eyvah
- Chatam Sofer – One may not deliver the baby of an idol worshipper on Shabbat, even if there is absolutely NO Shabbat violation at all, due to the explanation of Abaye
- Chazon Ish – One may deliver the baby of a Ger Toshav on Shabbat as long as no D’Oraytah violation occurs
- Chatam Sofer – One may deliver the baby of a Ger Toshav on Shabbat as long as NO violation of Shabbat occurs, even Rabbinic decrees
Is it possible that according to Rambam, that contemporary
monotheistic gentiles can be considered a Ger Toshav? The simple answer to this
question has to be that no, it is not possible. That is because according to
Rambam[99],
in order for a person to be considered a ger toshav, he must accept upon
himself to keep the seven Noahide laws
in front of a Beit Din of three people.
Furthermore, we also only accept people to this status during a time
that the laws of Yovel are in effect [100].
So it would seem clear that according to Rambam, contemporary mono theists,
even if they keep the noahide laws, cannot be considered Gerei Toshav with all
of the Halachic privileges that are given to Gerei Toshav.
[1] R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe
vol. 4:79; R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Weiss, Responsum Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 1
53, vol. 3 20, vol. 10 31:14; R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenburg, Responsum Tzitz
Eliezer, vol. 8 15:6; R. Ovadia Yosef, Responsum Yabia Omer, vol. 8
Orah Hayim 38; R. Shlomo Zalman Braun, She'arim Metzuyanim Bahalakhah,
92:1; R. Zvi Hirsch Shapira, Darkhei Teshuvah, 158:3; R. Yehoshua
Yishayahu Neuwirth, Shemirat Shabbat Kehilkhatah ch. 40 n. 42; R. Simhah
Benzion Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot, 390:2
[2] See “Between the Yeshiva World and Modern
Orhodoxy:The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg by Marc Shapiro
Portland, Oregon 2002 page 182 footnote 47, where he quotes a conversation
between Gerald Blidstein and R Joseph B. Soloveitchik, where Gerald Blidstein
recalls as follows: ‘I remember that in Israel there was a real problem, do you
save a gentile on the Sabbath? One evening during this time (I presume this was
during the prominent “Shahak affair”) I was with the rav, and he said, “I have
been in Boston many years and I always rule that one saves the lives of
gentiles, because if we don’t permit this, they won’t treat our sick ones.” I
asked him if this reason satisfied him from a moral standpoint, and he replied,
“No, from a moral standpoint it does not satisfy me.” ‘ We can infer from this conversation that R’
Joseph B Soloveitchik indeed shared our moral concerns regarding this Halachah. This may be what led the Rav to rule that
even when no eyvah applied that we should save the lives of Gentiles, as we
quote in the name of R’ Ahron Lichtenstein at the end of this article
[3] Iggerot Moshe Orach Chaim 4:79
http://www.wnd.com/2012/05/rabbi-treating-injured-gentiles-violates-sabbath/, for just a few examples
[5] See The late Lord Rabbi Immanuel
Jacobovits for one example. http://www.edah.org/backend/document/jakobovits1.html
[7] Avodah Zarah 26a
[8] Chiddushei HaRitva Avodah Zarah 26a
[9] Rabbeinu Nissim on the Rif 7b
[10] Beit yosef bedek habayis 154:2
[11] Shulchan Arch Orach Chaim 330:2, Mishna
Berura 330:8
[12] Tosfot Avodah Zarah 26a D’H “Savar”, see
analysis of Tosfot in Tzitz Eliezer Chelek 8 Siman 15 Perek 6:2
[13] Tosfot Shabbat OC 330:5
[14] Shut Maharik 137
[15] Avodah Zarah Perek 2, Mishna 1:6
[16] YD 131
[17] OC 2:25
[18] See
R’ Ovadiah Yosef in Halachah U’Refuah Chelek 1 page 147 who explains the
Divrei Chaim this way
[19] See R’ Eliezer Waldenburg in Tzitz
Eliezer Chelek 8 Siman 15 Perek 6:10 who explains the Divrei Chaim this way
[20] Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 330:2, Mishna
Berura 330:8
[21] See footnote 1
[22]
Among others, the DSA was also taken by R’ Dr Yaakov Avigdor in Ohr HaMizrach.
Interestingly, an article by Dr Ellman in
R’ Shimon Shkop
[23]
See the Kol Torah Journal Adar 5726, Jerusalem,
Shana 37, Choveret 6 Pages 95-99
[26]
Shut She’elat Shlomo 3:105
[27]
Yoma 85a
[28]
See Rif and Ran in Yoma 5a
[29]
See Rosh Yoma Chapter 8 # 16
[30]
Hilchot Shabbat 2:1
[31]
Hilchot Shabbat 2:3
[32]
The argument that R’ Student mentions that one does not violate Shabbat to save
a non-Observant Jew, is also questionable, as this Halachah was only stated
regarding one who is a Mumar L’Challel Shabbat B’Farhesyah, which is a very
different concept from an average Jew who may or may not keep Shabbat. See Pri
Megadim 328 MZ 6
[33] See R’ Dovid Z Hillman in
TZEFUNOT; I,1 (1988) page 65 for an extensive reworking of the Meiri that
follows this approach
[34]
Meiri mentions this in numerous places, however, it is most explicit in his
introductory comments to the first perek of avodah zarah D’H “Yesh makshim”
where he writes (in reference to the laws restricting business with gentiles
prior to their holidays, which he notes that the practical custom of Jews in
his day was not to adhere to these restrictions) as follows:
“..and behold the custom of
today is to permit business even on the day of their festival itself,
therefore, the real explanation seems to me that these restrictions were only
stated in regards to the worshippers of idols and the forms and shapes, however
in our days (with modern Christians) it is completely permitted. And that which
the Gemara states “Notzri L’Olam Assur” I explain that it refers (not to
Christians) but to the Notzrim who come from faraway lands as it states in
Jeremiah 4:16, …”
Two important points are evident from the Meiri:
1) That
he does not consider modern Christians to be idolaters
2) That
all business restrictions against “idol worshippers” do not apply to modern
Christians
[35]
See Meiri’s comments in Yoma 84a, quoted in full in footnote #80
[36]
See Meiri Bava Kama 113b where he states as follows:
“[regarding one who finds the
lost object of an idol worshipper] returning it to him is derech Chassidut, and we are not obligated to
act in the way of chassidut for someone who has no religion and similarly to
cause him to err … there is no obligation to return it however anyone who comes
from the nations that are gedurim bedarchei haDat and the worship of god, even
if their faith is very different from ours, they are not included in this rule
but rather they are like a full Jew for these matters whether for his lost
object or for causing him to err and for all other things without any
difference…”
[37]
See Meiri Sanhedrin 57b where he writes explicitly as follows:
“…and a Jew who kills a
gentile, any gentiles who does not keep the seven noahide laws, is not liable
for the death penalty because he is an idol worshipper, although it is none the
less prohibited to do so … but if they are of those gentiles who abide by the
seven noahide laws, he is considered among the
baalei hadat (and thus the Jew would be liable for the death penalty .. and
even though the simple reading of this sugya seems to say something else be careful not to make a mistake and
explain it any other way (than I just explained it)
[38]
See Meiri Avodah Zarah 20a where he writes as follows:
“[regarding the law not to
give a matnat chinam (free gift) to an idol worshipper] the Tosefta explains
that this rule only applies to a gentile who is not an acquaintance of his or a
traveler, but if he was his neighbor or his friend than he is allowed to give
him gifts because it is similar to a sale, however anyone who is a member of
one of the nations that is gedurot bedarchei hadatot and they believe in God,
there is no doubt that even if he is not his acquaintance and he does not know
him, it is permitted, and even appropriate …”
[39]
See Meiri Bava Kama 37b where he writes as follows:
“According to what is said in
the Gemara, this law (the law that when the ox of a Jew gores the ox of a
gentile that he is not obligated to pay) applies only to the nations which are
not restricted by ways of religions and customs, as the Gemara said of them,
"[God] saw that the Sons of Noah [non-Jews] were not fulfilling the Seven
Commandments they accepted upon themselves, so He permitted their property to
the Jews," as long as they are obliged by these commandments -- therefore,
those [non-Jews] who fulfill the Seven Commandments should be treated by us as
we are treated by them, and we should not favor ourselves in judgment; now it
is unnecessary to specify that this is also the case concerning the nations
restricted by ways of religions and customs.”
[40]
See Meiri Avodah Zarah 26a where he writes as follows (commenting on the
mishnayot that list numerous Halachot regarding idol worshippers including not
leaving animals under their care out of suspicion of bestiality, not delivering
their infants, not getting a haircut from an idol worshipper and more, see
Mishna Avodah Zarah Perek 2):
“I have seen many people
puzzled by the fact that nowadays nobody is careful to observe these laws. But
I have already explained which Gentile nations are meant in this tractate; and
the names of their holidays will also testify to it: for, as I mentioned above,
they all are feasts of ancient nations, not restricted by the ways of
religions, but practicing fervently and persistently worship of idols, stars
and talismans, which -- and all things like them -- are essentials of idolatry,
as has been already explained. But in any event, with regard to [avoiding] the
possibility of violation of the prohibitions concerning Sabbath and the
prohibitions concerning food and drinks [of non-Jews] -- e. g. [the ban] on
wine of libation, and on their wine per se, and all those type of bans, whether
it is only consuming something [of theirs] in food which was banned, or getting
any advantage of it, or if the bans were made in order to prevent
intermarriages -- all the [non-Jewish] nations come under these prohibitions...
From now on, let these things be settled on your mind, so that it will not be
necessary to clarify them specifically on each and every occasion, but you
should be able to analyze on your own whether in any particular case the
ancient nations are meant or the non-Jews in general; examine things, and you
will know them.”
Here Meiri lays out clearly his rule differentiating
between those laws which are designed to keep Jews from intermarrying with
gentiles, which he believes applies to all gentiles, and the laws that are
based on their immorality, which he believes did not apply to modern gentiles.
[41] Introductory letter to Hayyim David
Halevi, Bein Yisrael la-Ammim (Jerusalem, 1954), pp.16-17
[42] The extent to which Meiri’s Halachic
opinions differed from his predecessors and contemporaries , and the extent to
which Meiri believed in this seemingly revolutionary philosophy, is a subject
of intense scholarly discussion. While
this is beyond the scope of this article, I will at least guide you to some of
the most important sources on this subject:
- Jacob Katz, Beyn Yehudim le-goyim: Yahas ha-Yehudim li-shekheneyhem bi- Yemey ha-Beynayim u-bi-tehillat ha-Zeman he-Hadash (Jerusalem, 1960); see esp. pp.35–56.
- Ephraim E. Urbach, “Shittat ha-sovlanut shel R. Menahem ha-Me’iri: Mekorah u-migbaloteha,” in Studies in the History of Jewish Society in the Middle Ages and in the Modern Period Presented to Professor Jacob Katz on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday, ed. I. Etkes and Y. Salmon (Jerusalem, 1980), 34–44 [reprinted in Ephraim E. Urbach, Mehkarim be-madda‘ey ha-Yahadut, ed. Moshe David Herr and Yonah Fraenkel, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1996), 366–76].
- R’ David Berger “Jews, gentiles, and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos Some Tentative Thoughts” at this link:
- Moshe Halbertal, Beyn Torah le-hokhmah: Rabbi Menahem ha-Me’iri u-ba‘ale ha-Halakhah ha-maimoniyyim bi-Provence (Jerusalem, 2000).
- Meiri and the non-Jew: A Comparative Investigation by Dr. Yaakov Elman Published by Brill Publishing 2011 “New Perspectives on Jewish-Christian Relations” p.263-296
- Gregg Stern, Philosophy and Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Interpretation and Controversy in Medieval Languedoc (London, 2009).
To summarize, Jacob Katz presented the
Meiri as an innovative and original thinker who developed a unique and almost
modern philosophical framework of a new Jewish attitude towards Gentiles. Urbach sharply criticized Katz and pointed
out numerous inconsistencies within the Meiri, and Halbertal demonstrated that
Katz’s view was much closer to the truth. Stern and Berger agreed with
Halbertal’s view and supported Katz.
I will admit that I have been heavily
influenced by Halbertal, and this article reflects my feelings on this
issue. I must refer the reader though to
Dr. Elman’s work, who, like Urbach, points out numerous inconsistencies in the
Meiri. This led Dr. Elman to propose
that the Meiri did not quite have such a consistent philosophy regarding the
proper attitude towards non-Jews. In all
fairness, I must recommend that the interested reader should read Dr Elman’s
article in its’ entirety and decide for themselves. However, I would like to mention here some of
my own thoughts regarding the “inconsistencies” of the Meiri raised by Urbach
and Elman.
Three key “inconsistencies” were the
following:
- The Meiri's comment that it would be Middat Chasidut not to allow one's child to nurse from a gentile nurse "because a child's food plays a large role in the child's moral formation" (see footnote 3 on page 266)
- The Meiri's understanding of the laws of Tumah regarding a non-Jewish corpse and that they do not transmit tumat ohel because they are not included in the category of "adam" (see section III of his article started on page 278)
- The Meiri's acceptance of the Halachah that a non-Jew cannot serve as a "shaliach" (agent) for a Jew, not only in religious matters such as terumah, but even in civil matters, because they are not included in the verse "atem - gam atem".
Elman sees all of these as contradictory
to the Meiri's seemingly liberal views regarding nations that are "gedurim
bedarchei hadat" and demonstrate that the Meiri was conflicted about this
position.
Personally, I believe that the Meiri was actually quite consistent in his views nations that are gedurim bedarchei haDat. However, the Meiri also acknowledged that although the nations that are “gedurim bedarchei haDatot” are in many ways equal to Jews, the Torah is still a superior system of morality and leads to a superior development of spirituality than the other religions. For this reason, when Jews keep the Torah, there is something special about the Jewish people that no matter how spiritual and moral a gentile is, he/she is still not a Jew who adheres to the Torah. This is something so obvious from so many areas of the Torah and Chazal that it cannot be disputed. All of the examples mentioned reflect the Meiri's understanding of this fundamental difference between Jews and Gentiles. The nursing issue, the Tumah issue and not being included in the category of "Adam", and the inability to serve as an agent due to being excluded from the category "atem", all of these are true only because even the Meiri acknowledges that on a certain spiritual level, there is something special that is unique to the Jewish people which even the most moral gentile cannot attain (without converting to Judaism of course). this does not seem inconsistent to me at all. Please see footnote 92 for more discussion of the Meiri and the origin of his opions.
The Meiri clearly did not mean to equate Jews and non-Jews in every way possible, as we can see that he clearly upheld the restrictions that discouraged intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews. He simply developed a philosophy that accorded significant respect and humanity to societies of gentiles that upheld moral and ethical systems of belief and behavior.
[44] Vayikra 25:17
[45] Rosh yeshiva of Yeshiva Birkat Moshe in
Maaleh Adumim, in Shut Melumdei Milchamah Hilchot Shabbat:43
[46] in his comments on The Rambam Sefer
HaMitzvot 16, also Rashbatz in Zohar HaRakia Azharot 39 states that saving the
life of a Ger Toshav supersedes Shabbat, and he brings Ramban as his source,
Also see Ramban in his commentary on the Torah VaYikra 25:35 where he derives
the mitzvah of Pikuach Nefesh from the words “vechay Imach” which refers to a
ger toshav
[47] See his essay titled “Tiferes L’Yisrael”
[48]
This important distinction between Meiri’s category of nations that are
“gedurim bedarchei hadatot” and the idea that the concept of Ger Toshav can be
applied to contemporary gentiles as R’ Rabinovich is arguing, is elaborated in
detail by Halbertal. It was also
recognized by R’ Yehuda Gershuni in the article quoted in the next paragraph
[49] “Or HaMizrach” Volume 16, p. 34. I found this source through the generous help
of Prof. Marc B. Shapiro.
[50]
Shut Mitzpeh Aryeh Tinyana Chelek 1 Siman 10 Lvov, 1912 . I found this source through the generous help
of Prof. Marc B. Shapiro.
[51]
Vayikra 25:35,36 (JPS translation)
[52]
It may be possible to suggest that while the verse in Vayikra 18:5 “ve-chai
bahem” teaches us that one may violate a commandment of the Torah to save one’s
own life, it may not be enough to teach us that one must also violate the Torah
to save someone else’s life. For this reason the Sifra according to the Ramban
requires an additional pasuk of “ve-chai akhikha imakh” to tell us that one is
also obligated to violate the Torah to save other’s lives as well. This understanding of the Ramban is also to
be found in the Sefer Mishnat Avraham by R’ Avraham Ahron Preis, Pomer
Publishing, Toronto, Canada 1950. I found this source through the generous help
of Prof. Marc Shapiro.
[53]
See Peirush Rabbeinu Hillel on Sifra on this verse, and one of the earliest Peirushim of the
Sifra
[54]
Rashbatz in Zohar HaRakia Azharot 39
[55]
See Meiri’s comments in bava Metziah 59b for one important example, and see
Halbertal p. 88 for more details on this approach of Meiri
[56]
See his comments in Sefer HaMitzvot Mitzvat aseih :16
[57]
Mishna Torah Hilchot Shabbat 2:12
[58]
Rashi Vayikra 25:35
[59]
Avodah Zarah 64b
[60]
Eruchin 29a
[61]
Hilchot Issurei Biah 14:7,8
[62]
See Be’er hagolah, Be’er 7
[63]
See page 144 in the paragraph which begins “Ve’od Amru” in the popular Hoenig
edition Bnei Brak 1980
[64]
See page 145 in the paragraph which begins “Nimtzah” in the popular Hoenig
edition Bnei Brak 1980
[65]
Shemot 21
[66]
This essay was printed in a work entitled “Sheni Perakim'al Davar haHov
l'Ohev haKaisar” and it was
published in St. Petersburg in 1852. It
was a challenge to find, but I was able to secure a copy of the book from a
friend in Silver Spring MD Dan Rabinowitz. This teshuva is discussed in the Journal
Yeshurun Volume 4 5759 (1998) pages 655-663 in an article by R’ Eliezer
Katzman. He describes the interesting
circumstances behind the publishing of this teshuva under the auspices of the
Czarist Government. One might question the sincerity of Rav Heller’s teshuva on
the grounds that it might have been coerced and not truly reflective of his
Halachic opinions. There are several scholars who have described the circumstances
of the writing and publication of this work, and I will refer the reader here
to two of these. I highly recommend that the interested reader see these
articles for him/herself.
1) A.
Shochet "Mashehu 'al HaSefer 'Shnei Perakim' SINAI 102 (1988) PP. 63-71
2) Eliezer
Katzman, “L’Demuto shel R”Y Heller Ba’al Amudei Ohr” Yeshurun Volume 4,
p.655-663
There are several reasons why I believe that this
teshuva represents the genuine Halachic position of Rav Heller. I will
summarize these reasons as follows:
1) Rav
Heller’s Teshuva was written in response to a query by his cousin R’ Avraham
David Strashun of Vilna, there is no indication that this teshuva was coerced
any more than any of the other teshuvos R’ Heller write to this very same
family member. It may be true that the publisher Mendelstam published this
teshuva in order to ingratiate himself with the authorities, but there is no
reason to believe that this influenced R’ Heller when he wrote it.
2) Rav
Heller wrote a lengthy teshuva of almost 40 pages, including almost 20 pages
full of Halachic conclusions that could be made based on his basic chiddush
that entire nations that accept the sheva mitzvos are considered gerei
toshav. If it was simply an apologetic
nod to the Czarist government, there would have been no need to discuss the
Halachic ramifications regarding yayin Nesech and stam yaynam, Hilchos yichud,
the issur to sell weapons to a gentile, beyomo titeyn secharo, Hilchot ona'ah,
hashavat aveidah, tzedakah and many more.
3) Rav
Heller makes many of the same arguments that are also made by the others
mentioned in this article, many of whom were writing Halachic opinions and not
apologetics. This includes the Mitzpeh Aryeh, the Maharal, and numerous others
quoted in this article
4) R’
Heller’s basic argument is used by other major poskim in determining Halachah.
Most important of which is R AYH Kook (see the following footnote) who uses the
same argument as part of the reasoning that allowed the sale of EY during
shemittah. Rav Herzog also used the same argument as well. Neither of these
authorities quoted R’ Heller, though it is unlikely that they would have had
access to his sefer which was rare and only published once. If they took this
position as a serious Halachic possibility why shouldn’t we assume that R’
Heller meant it as well?
5) R’
Katzman has in his possession a teshuva written by another great 19th
century Lithuanian posek that responded to and refuted the arguments of R’
Heller. This manuscript has not yet been
published, but it is unlikely that the other Rabbinic leaders would have needed
to write Halachic responses to R’ Heller if his teshuva was never serious in
the first place and his only purpose was to placate the Czarist government.
6) In
a conversation with R’ Tzvi Hersh Weinreb (Executive VP Emeritus of the
Orthodox Union and Editor in Chief of the Koren Talmud Bavli) he also added the
following point. Every teshuva that is written is influenced by the
circumstances surrounding it, but we don’t dismiss the teshuva just because it
was influenced by its circumstances! We still need to take what R’ Heller said
seriously, as it still remains valid as an opinion.
7) I
discussed this as well with Prof. Marc Shapiro who concurred that the teshuva
did not follow the usual pattern of apologetic literature that consists of a
several sentence disclaimer claiming that all references to gentiles only refer
to the idol worshippers of Talmudic times, not our contemporary gentiles. Instead, he wrote an entire teshuva
demonstrating this idea.
8) Neither
of the articles I referenced above (The Katzman article or the Shochet
article), provides any evidence that the actual teshuva of Rav Heller was
written under pressure. Although it is
clear that the publication of the book, and other material (especially the
German translation) was written mostly to appease the authorities, the teshuva
of Rav Heller seems genuine for the reasons which I stated.
[67]
Interestingly, R’ AYH Kook in Shut Mishpat Kohen Laws of Shemittah and Yovel 58
seems to take this position as well. He
says there that the laws of “Lo Techaneim” do not apply to Muslims because they
accepted the worship of One God as a nation.
R’ Y Herzog in “Nochrim BeMedinah Yehudit” published by “Beit Reuvein
Mass” Jerusalem 2008 understood R’ Kook to be saying that since they accepted
monotheism as a nation that they have the laws of Gerei Toshav, see his words
on the top of page 59, “as my predecessor (R’ Kook) determined that an entire
nation that accepts upon itself the seven laws has the status of Geirim
toshavim”
[68]
See R' Heller pages 50,51 paragraphs 3 and 4
[69]
See R’ Heller page 69 paragraph 44
[70]
See Chemdas Yisrael Pietrikov 5687, Kuntrus Ner Mitzvah p 202 number 35, also
note that according to R’ Plotski’s this is actually the opinion of Rambam
regarding contemporary monotheistic gentiles!
[71]
See Chemdas Yisrael Pietrikov 5687, Kuntrus Ner Yisrael, p 27 number 52, it is
worthwhile to review there his lengthy analysis of Ramban’s opinion
[72]
See “Kol Sifrei Maharatz Chajes” Jerusalem 5718, page 489
[74]
Shut Mitzpeh Aryeh Tinyana Chelek 1 Siman 10 Lvov, 1912 . I found this source through the generous help
of Prof. Marc B. Shapiro.
[75]
“Or HaMizrach” Volume 16, p. 34. I found
this source through the generous help of Prof. Marc B. Shapiro.
[76]
Pirush HaRan al HaRif Avodah zarah 1b D.H. “Dinra”
[77] See chapter 8 of the book “Fundamentals
of Judaism” published by Feldheim, NY edited by Jacob Breuer
[78] See Hirsch in “The Collected Writings”,
volume 7, the essay titled “Talmudic Judaism and Society”
[79] See his commentary on Pirkei Avot 4:13
[80] The Meiri himself, when discussing the
laws of violating Shabbat to save a life, in Yoma 84a states, “Pikuach Nefesh Eyn holchin Bo Achar rov
– How is this? In a courtyard where there are present Jews and worshippers of
the stars and constellations (ovdei kochavim umazalot) for whom we are not
obligated to violate the Shabbat for them [to save their lives] because they
have no religion and they don’t even care for the general obligations of
civilized living among others (Sh’eyn lahem shum dat vegam eynam chosheshim
lechovat chevrat ha’adam)”
Several
points are clear from this statement of the Meiri.
1) He clearly states that we are obligated to violate Shabbat to save the
life of a gentile who is a ben dat, consistent with our thesis
2) It is clear that the reason why we are
obligated is because they are included in the category of benei dat, and not because of the concept of ger toshav
3) We get another hint as to why he feels
that being a “ben dat” is so important, because only people with a religion are
moral and civilized. This lends strong
support to what we claim later in this article that had the Meiri been aware of
moral societies that are not religious, he would probably have agreed that they
too would warrant chillul Shabbat to save their lives. There are many other such references in the
Meiri, but this one was written specifically regarding chillul Shabbat, so I felt
it was important to mention here.
[81] see Iggrot Reiyah vol. 1 page 99
[82] Techukah L’Yisrael Al Pi HaTorah vol 3 p.
278 (Jerusalem , 1989)
[83] See his book “Logic of the Heart, Logic
of the Mind” pages 139, 151
[84] see Torah Umaddah Journal 7 - 1997)
[85] See J. David Bleich,
“Divine Unity in Maimonides, the Tosafists and Me’iri,” in Neoplatonism
and
Jewish Thought, ed. Lenn
E. Goodman (Albany, 1992), 237–254 who argues that Meiri had a mistaken view of
Christian theology
[87] See Halbertal in Bein Torah le Chokhmah
p. 101 note 35
[88] Page 26 of the above article
[89] Avodah Zarah 20a
[90] Tosefta Avodah Zarah 3(4):14,
ed. M. S. Zuckermandel
[91] See “Laws of medical Treatment on
Shabbat” by R’ Dov Karrol available here http://www.yuTorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/756185/_Dov_Karoll/Laws_of_Medical_Treatment_on_Shabbat
[92] Exactly what influenced the Meiri to
develop a Halachic philosophy that was so different from most other authorities
is a fascinating question. I would point anyone interested in learning more
about the influences that caused the Meiri to develop his philosophy to
footnote # 42, and especially to Dr Elman’s article. While Halbertal and others claimed that it
was the unique intellectual and religious environment that existed in Provence
that led to the Meiri’s departure from Halachic norms, Dr. Elman has a much
more interesting explanation for the Meiri’s unique attitudes. He claims that the Meiri had a special
emotional relationship with a Christian scholar whom he respected and dealt
with as a close friend and confidant. Dr
Elman believes that it was this deep emotional connection which led the Meiri
to develop a philosophy that justified fostering respectful and meaningful
interpersonal relationships with people of other faiths.
This idea
is carried much further in another article by Israel ben Simon,"The
Origins of the Meiri’s Commentary on the book of Proverbs and the Concept of
'Nations Bound by the Ways of Religion'" (JSIJ - Jewish Studies, an
Internet Journal available here). Ben Simon argues that the
Meiri was heavily influenced by the writings of R’ Jacob Anatoly, the
son-in-law of the famous R’ Shmuel ibn Tibbon, translator of many of the works
of the Rambam. Anatoly is the author of
a work called “Melmad HaTalmidim” and in it there are many references to his
opinions regarding the status of non-Jews.
Ben Simon points out many parallels between the thoughts of the Meiri
and the writings of Anatoly, in some cases even using almost identical
language. It is well known that Anatoly
was a close friend of the Christian scholar Michael Scots. This leads one to wonder what kind of
influence the friendship of Anatoly and Scots, and Meiri and his Christian
friend had on their thoughts regarding the status of gentiles.
To carry
this thinking further, it is worthwhile considering the article by Professor
Menachem Kellner, “We are not alone”. In
this article he discusses the idea that the difference between Jews and
Gentiles can be understood in two ways.
One is what he attributes to R’ Yehuda HaLevi, and that is that there is
an ontological difference between the Jew and gentile, something totally
independent of the Torah how the person behaves and/or believes. The second, and according to Kellner the more
ancient and authentic approach is that the entire difference between Jew and
Gentile is simply based on the Torah and the moral lifestyle that a Torah
observant nation adheres to. In this
scheme, a gentile who is moral and ethical would be on a “higher” level than a
Jew who disregards the Torah.
Kellner
traces this idea through the thinking of the Rambam and the Maimonideans who
followed in his footsteps. If one puts
all of this together, one finds a clear path from the Rambam, through R’ Shmuel
ibn Tibbon and Anatoly, to the Meiri.
When thought of in this way, the Meiri’s thoughts are not quite as
revolutionary as we thought. They merely
are the halachic application of ideas that had been around for centuries.
Dr Elman's
idea is also very relevant to those of us who live in contemporary society and
interact regularly with many fine and moral gentiles who often personify the
values that we consider to be “darchei datot venimusim” the ways of religion
and ethics. Our personal relationships
with members of other faiths have led us to realize that they can often be
intelligent, spiritual and deeply moral people just like Jewish people can be.
The opinions of Meiri are therefore quite understandable to the 21st
century Modern Orthodox Jew.
[93]
Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:18
[94]
Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:4
[95]
Hilchot Shabbat 2:12
[96]
See Chazon Ish OC 59:5, it seems clear from his words that he understood that
Rambam held like Tosfot that only Issurei deRabbanan were permissible due to
eyvah, but that Abaye’s explanation still stands today, therefore, for a ger
Toshav, Issurei deRabbanan would be permitted.
[97]
See Chatam Sofer YD 131,
[98]
(Though this is certainly not
the only possible interpretation of the Maggid Mishna’s words, this is how
Chatam Sofer understood them; that she is able to claim that there is Chillul Shabbat, even though in actuality there
may not actually be any Chillul
Shabbat. An alternate understanding of the Maggid Mishna would be as follows:
“Le’Hishamet” - that she may slip out of the sticky situation by saying …
“Velomar lah” -and say to her etc… This
understanding would not support the Chatam Sofer at all.)
[99]
Hilchot Melachim 8:10
[100]
Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6