Friday, April 23, 2021

Does the Torah Actually Prohibit all Homosexual Intercourse?

I apologize for the time lapse between this post and my last one.  Honestly, I have been thinking about and reading about and studying this issue for quite some time.  Since we are about to read the portion of Leviticus this week  in synagogue that is the center of this discussion, I decided it was time to release this post.  I hope that all of my readers are willing to join me on this journey through a very challenging subject.  Those of you that have been following me for the last ten years have learned that this blog is not designed for those people who like to read a rant in which I express an opinion and throw around a few things to support my opinion.  You can go to FaceBook for that.  I will take the time necessary to take apart an issue from beginning to end, even if that takes several years and a lot of work.  More importantly, even if it means finding out that my preconceived ideas were completely wrong. 

We established in previous posts here that the prohibition in Leviticus 18 and 20 prohibits penetrative anal intercourse between two males.  We also wrote that this was how Chazal understood this prohibition, and how it was interpreted by Halachic authorities ever since.  Presumably, this would mean that if two adult men, both of whom are gay, had a consensual, loving, and committed long-term relationship, that sexual intercourse would be forbidden.

In chapter 13 of his book, Rabbi Steven Greenberg presents an analysis of the verses in Vayikra.  Many other scholars have made similar analyses over the years, and I cannot review all of them and their arguments.  I had to pick one, so I picked Rabbi Greenberg.  Very similar ideas were also presented in a famous (or infamous, depending on your perspective) speech given by Rabbi Joseph Dweck in May 2017.  He presented almost the same ideas but stopped short of claiming that we should apply these ideas in practical Halacha.  You can see his lecture hereI will present his basic argument, and then analyze if we can practically apply them and remain within the bounds of accepted Orthodox Halacha. 

I am aware that an exact definition of the term "accepted Orthodox Halacha" is not so easy to find. Please allow me to define it the way I understand it for the purposes of this blog.  Orthodox Halacha means that we interpret the Torah She'beKtav (the written Torah) according to the way that Chazal (the rabbis of the Mishna and Talmud) taught us in the Torah She'be'al Peh (the oral Torah) If Chazal tell us how to interpret a verse in the Torah and then teach us practical Halacha on that basis, Orthodoxy demands that we follow that interpretation While it is true that there are "Shivim Panim La'Torah" (seventy "faces" - potential interpretations) to the Torah, we cannot decide on our own that we can change practical Halacha if it means interpreting a verse in the Torah in a manner expressly different from the way it was interpreted by Chazal. 

I will present Rabbi Greenberg’s argument as a series of points rather than by developing his entire narrative. If you want to see his entire argument, please see his book. These points are meant to read as a progression of arguments and observations leading to a conclusion. The numbering is not random. Forgive me please if I am oversimplifying his ideas. I ask his forgiveness in advance if I misrepresent his ideas, though I do think I do a pretty decent job summarizing them.  My goal is to present what is necessary for the purposes of my halachic discussion on this blog.  

  1. In ancient societies, penetrative sex was perpetrated by the powerful against the weak. It was a demonstration of dominance over the weaker or younger party, and it was humiliating. (Such practices still exist of course, for a graphic and contemporary example, think of those prisoners who abuse other prisoners by sexually assaulting them. They are usually not homosexual predators; they are just predators)
  2. Sadly, women were considered inferior, and the fact that men penetrate women during intercourse was seen as a way of showing dominationThe domination of male over female was an integral part of the institution of marriage in much of the ancient world. 
  3. Men who were on the receiving end of such intercourse were looked upon as if they were like women, in the sense that they were inferior and somehow beneath the "dominant" penetrator. In many ways, they were seen as if they had made themselves "like women". This was like willingly accepting an inferior and degraded status.
  4. Homosexual relationships, in the sense of two men who were committed to each other in bonds of love and respect were just "not a thing" in those days. 
  5. The verses in Leviticus are written in the context of other prohibitions against incest. By its' very definition, incest is an act in which someone abuses the trust that one has in a family member. The vulnerability of someone dependent on his/her family while a family member dominates and degrades the victim, is well understood by modern psychologists. The victim is typically helpless and has nowhere to turn, as the people who are supposed to protect them are the perpetrators. 
  6. In this context, it makes sense that the Torah prohibits male/male intercourse as it is degrading to the victim, and even the willing victim is guilty of allowing himself to be degraded in a way unbecoming of God's creation.
  7. When the Torah writes that one may not "lie with a man" it was already obvious that the intent was to prohibit penetrative intercourse, as this is what it always means and what it meant in every other verse. 
  8. The only reason the Torah needed to add the term "as one lies with a woman" is to tell us that it is this type of denigrative and abusive penetrative sex that is prohibited between malesThis would not apply to a loving, consensual, long-term relationship between two homosexual males. 

The attractiveness of accepting this as the reading of the verse is obvious. It would end our conundrum with which I began this blog thread.  It would both leave the prohibition of Leviticus intact, while still allowing for sexual activity between two gay and committed men. But can this be acceptable halachically? Does this violate the rule that we cannot interpret a verse contrary to the interpretation of Chazal when it changes practical Halacha?

I will henceforth refer to the type of intercourse prohibited by the Torah according to rabbi Greenberg as "humiliative", and the type of intercourse that would be permitted as "relationship".

The truth is that this interpretation of the verse feels forced.  I have always read the verse my entire life the standard way and concluded that the Torah prohibits male/male penetrative intercourse, period.  Every time I have read the sugyot in Shas, I assumed that Chazal read it this way as well.  Clearly, the poskim throughout history understood it this way.  I asked myself to play a thought experiment.  What if I had been taught Rabbi Greenberg's interpretation of the verses from childhood, how would I have learned the sugyot in shas?  What if I lived in a society like the one I just described in ancient times?  What if I had always assumed that what God found abhorrent was humiliative intercourse between men? Is it possible that Chazal really also understood it this way, and that if I started with a different idea of the meaning of the verse, maybe I would have read the gemara differently too? 

I am virtually certain that this post will be misunderstood by some readers, so I am going to try to be very clear about what I am about to do in this post:

  1. The verses in Leviticus have been understood throughout the Halachic literature to be referring to all types of homosexual male/male penetrative intercourse
  2. The poskim read both the Torah and Chazal with the above assumption intact
  3. Rabbi Greenberg suggested that the Torah was only referring to humiliative, and not relationship intercourse (my terms, not his)
  4. If Chazal interpreted the verse to be referring to all types of male/male intercourse, then we cannot as Orthodox Jews accept Rabbi Greenberg's suggestion, no matter how much we may want to
  5. Is it possible that we have read Chazal incorrectly as well? Maybe Chazal also understood the verses to be referring only to humiliative intercourse?
  6. If we can demontstrate that the above assumption is even possible, then although Rabbi Greenberg's suggestion certainly goes against many centuries of Halachic understanding, but it isn't completely outside of the Orthodox range of possibilites
The rest of this post will be discussing this one problem only. That is the question of whether it is possible that we have been reading Chazal wrong for all these years.  I am only asking if it is possible, not if it is true or not. There are many other issues that will be dealt with in future posts. Please bear in mind that this will be an exceptionally long journey. I beg the reader to allow me the opportunity to go through this process before you think you know what my conclusions will be. Here goes: 

In our previous discussion, we brought two Talmudic sources, one from Yevamot and one from Sanhedrin, which established that Chazal understood the prohibition of leviticus to be referring to penetrative intercourse between males.  Chazal certainly do not point out this differentiation between two types of male/male intercourse (which I will now refer to as "humiliative" versus "relationship" intercourse).  However, let's assume for the moment that Chazal understood it as a given that the male/male intercourse being prohibited was humiliative, as we described above.

While this may seem surprising to many of us at first, let me present the following analysis of every known reference in the Talmud regarding homosexuality.  I want to see if it is possible that Chazal, when they wrote of this prohibition, only meant humiliative intercourse.  If it is plausible, then Rabbi Greenberg's theory might be able to remain within the bounds of Orthodox halacha.  If not, then no matter how nice his explanation sounds, it cannot be considered acceptable within Orthodoxy.

Berachot 43b

Six things are disgraceful for a Torah scholar: He may not go out perfumed into the marketplace; he may not go out of his house alone at night; he may not go out wearing patched shoes; he may not converse with a woman in the marketplace; he may not recline and participate in a meal in the company of ignoramuses; and he may not be the last to enter the study hall. And some say that he may not take long strides and he may not walk with an upright posture. The Gemara elaborates on the statements of the baraita. He may not go out perfumed into the marketplace; Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This prohibition only applies in a place where they are suspected of homosexuality. One who goes out into the marketplace perfumed, will arouse suspicion. Rav Sheshet said: We only said this with regard to his clothing that was perfumed, but with regard to his body, it is permitted, as his sweat causes the fragrance to dissipate. Rav Pappa said: In this regard, his hair is considered like his clothing. And some say: His hair is considered like his body.

Based on the context, the reason for the prohibition against a Torah Scholar going out perfumed in the marketplace, is that people may suspect that his intent is to engage in homosexual acts.  One wonders why Chazal were not concerned that he may be suspected of illicit heterosexual acts?  The next prohibition, going out alone at night, is prohibited due to this very same reason. The perfume, however, is by nature meant to attract others.  One might explain, that for someone about to engage in an exploitative activity, such as to hire a prostitute (and presumably to penetrate her sexually and exploit her vulnerability and need for money), which is what one is suspect of going out alone at night, he need not attract attention to himself.  However, if one wants to be receptive and allow another to penetrate him, he will want to make himself attractive by perfuming himself. 

 

This is by no means a definitive proof, but making oneself receptive to intercourse and allowing oneself to be humiliated in such a way (remember that this is how receptive male/male intercourse was viewed in the contemporary society) would be exactly the type of intercourse forbidden by the Torah.  The type of intercourse one attracts by wandering around the marketplace is not the type of loving, consensual intercourse that we are calling relationship intercourse.  So is it at least possible so far that Chazal understood the prohibition against male/male intercourse to be referring only to humiliative intercourse? Yes, so far it is at least possible. 

Kiddushin 82a