What is the Torah Talking About? - Pederasty and the Prohibiton in Leviticus

We have clearly established in an earlier blog post here that Chazal and the later Halachic literature has interpreted the verses in Leviticus to be prohibiting penetrative intercourse between two men.  Whenever the Torah commands us to do or not to do something, the question that often follows is "Why".  Even asking the question itself raises important philosophical issues that Jewish thinkers have discussed and debated ever since the Torah was given at Sinai.  These issues include, but are not limited to, the following: 

• Is it appropriate to ask why God commands us anything, or is it better to accept His commands simply because He said so? 
• if you establish the reasoning behind a commandment, can you disobey the commandment when a reason does not apply? 
• Are the commands meant to teach us lessons, and if so, isn't it necessary to understand why God commanded us? 
• Are the reasons behind the commands metaphysical, i.e., do they have effects in a spiritual realm that we cannot ever understand? Or are the reasons very real and understandable within the world in which we live? 

Obviously, Jewish thinkers from time immemorial have taken different positions on this matter.  All the way on the rationalist side, there is Maimonides who teaches that every commandment has a logical and rational reason.  According to Maimonides, knowing and understanding this reason is an important part of understanding the Torah.  Furthermore, Maimonides taught that the mitzvot uplift us and make us and society in general better people and bring us closer to the ideals God wants from us. He devoted a large portion of his famous work, The Guide for the Perplexed, the Moreh Nevuchim to elucidating these reasons (Moreh Nevuchim 3:26):

Note this, and understand it. The repeated assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all commandments, and the tradition that Solomon knew them, refer to the general purpose of the commandments, and not to the object of every detail. This being the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen precepts into classes: each class will include many precepts of the same kind, or related to each other by their character. I will [first] explain the reason of each class, and show its undoubted and undisputed object, and then I shall discuss each commandment in the class, and expound its reason. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in some cases even the object of many of the conditions and details as far as these can be discovered. You will hear all this later on. 

The Rambam thus asserts that we can ascertain the reason for each mitzvah, if only we were smart enough and worked hard enough.  While admitting that every detailed Halacha we may never figure out, even those details could be figured out if we only were capable of doing so.  He goes on to fulfill what he fills is the obligation to understand each mitzvah by explaining them in long detail. 

The other extreme are the more mystically inclined Kabbalists and their philosophical forebearers.  The Kabbalists tend to explain the mitzvot based on the spiritual effects of doing mitzvot of worlds and realms that are beyond our physical grasp.  However, even among Jewish philosophers not necessarily influenced by Kabbalah specifically, there exists a stream of thought that would rather explain that Mitzvot are simply God's will. Period.  Most famous of course is the Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi in his famous work, the Kuzari (Kuzari 2:26): 

I do not, by any means, assert that the purpose of the service is the order expounded by me. On the contrary, it entails something more secret and elevated. And I say that it is God's Torah. He who innocently accepts it without scrutiny or argument is better off than he who investigates and analyses. 

He says this after explaining reasons for mitzvot, specifically for the Temple service.  But although he admits that many mitzvot have clear and obvious reasons, accepting them as "God's Torah" is even better than finding reasons. 

This becomes especially relevant when discussing the commandment against intercourse between two men.  In both places where the Torah discusses the prohibition, it is within the context of other forbidden Arayot (sexual relationships).  Virtually all the forbidden relationships have moral and ethical components that make it clearly understandable why they should be prohibited.  A modern reader does not wonder when he reads that incest or adultery is forbidden.  Our moral sensibilities help us understand immediately what is wrong with such things.  The only possible exception is the restriction against Niddah (a menstruating woman) and indeed the literature is full of attempts at explaining why this is prohibited.  The reasons are of course beyond the scope of this blog. 

So what about homosexual intercourse? What is the reason for this prohibition?  will an inquiry into the reasoning of the Torah lead us to an understanding of the prohibition that might be different from the traditional understanding? This search for meaning has led many to understand the verse as referring to a specific type of intercourse that was particularly common in ancient times, and particularly repulsive and abusive. Something that it would make sense for the Torah to prohibit. 

Why Look for the Reason? 

I do need to make something clear.  The suggestion of Rabbi Greenberg and the others who follow om similar paths, is not that we can identify the reason for the Torah's prohibition, and therefore decide on our own when it does not apply.  This is not how Halacha works in Jewish Orthodoxy.  I will not expound on this too much here, as it would take far off course from our current mission.  However, it is the search for the reason for this commandment against homosexual intercourse that led Rabbi Greenberg and others to understand the meaning of the verses in a certain way.  Once they interpret the verse and understand it as saying something specific, it is the Torah itself that is prohibiting only this specific act.  At least according to Rabbi Greenberg and those who advocate similar arguments.    

Before we present his arguments, let me summarize the many reasons that have been proposed over the years in the Halachic literature for the prohibition against homosexual intercourse. Then I will get to the explanation of Rabbi Greenberg.  It is important to note, that only one "explanation" has its roots in the Talmud itself, and the meaning of this passage of the Talmud is not completely clear. The rest of the reasons proposed for the prohibition come from much later rabbinic literature.  The ONLY Talmudic era discussion that comes close to explaining a reason, is the Talmud in Nedarim. 

To'eh Attah Ba

The  gemara in Nedarim 51a says as follows:

Bar Kappara said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi at the wedding: What is the meaning of the word to’eva, abomination, used by the Torah to describe homosexual intercourse (see Leviticus 18:22)? Whatever it was that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to bar Kappara in explanation, claiming that this is the meaning of to’eva, bar Kappara refuted it by proving otherwise. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: You explain it. Bar Kappara said to him: Let your wife come and pour me a goblet of wine. She came and poured him wine. Bar Kappara then said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Arise and dance for me, so that I will tell you the meaning of the word: This is what the Merciful One is saying in the Torah in the word to’eva: You are straying after it [to’e ata bah], i.e., after an atypical mate.

The commentaries have many different understandings of this passage, so it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what Bar Kappara meant. The one thing that does seem clear is that there was something difficult about the idea that Torah called homosexual relations "an abomination". Otherwise, Rabbi Yehuda Hanassi would not have had such difficulty explaining it. Clearly, the Talmudic sages did not understand some fundamental about this prohibition and why it was so "abominable". So, they had to look for some other explanation, which Bar Kappara then provided.

The Ran (Rabbi Nissim of Gerona 1320-1376, foremost commentary on Tractate Nedarim) seems to understand that Bar Kappara was commenting on the deviancy of this behavior, that he is abandoning intercourse with a female which is more "normal" and exchanging it for a more "deviant" form of intercourse with a male. Rashi however (it is unclear if the author of "Rashi" on Nedarim is actually the famous Rashi or someone else) seems to explain that it is simply a description of someone who forsakes permissible intercourse (through marriage for example) and then chooses prohibited intercourse instead. The obvious question that arises would be according to Rashi, why did the Torah choose to use the term To'eva specifically in reference to homosexuality. For this reason, most subsequent commentators assume that "To'eh Atta Bah" means that nomosexuality is deviant, or at least different from the norm, as the Ran explained.

We will come back to this gemara later in our discussions.

Non-Procreative - Homosexual sex as "non-productive"

One of the classical explanations found in the rabbinic literature for the prohibition against homosexual intercourse, is that the sex has no positive purpose in procreation. This is because sex in a heterosexual relationship has a "productive" purpose and can produce offspring while homosexual sex cannot. This reason appears in many places, but most prominently in the Sefer Hachinuch (13th century Spain, author unknown) Mitzvah 209:4:

It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] because God, blessed be He, desired the settling of His world that He created. And therefore He commanded that [men] not destroy their seed with male homosexuality. As it is truly destruction, since there is neither [reproductive] benefit, nor a commandment of [a wife's] appointed time - besides that the matter of this craziness is disgusting and ugly to anyone with intelligence. And it is not fitting for a man who is born for the service of his Creator to become distorted (some have the textual variant, to become repulsive) with these ugly acts. 

This type of reasoning is mentioned often in the rabbinic literature, but it is important to note that it does not appear in the Talmudic or Mishnaic literature. I have seen it quoted from the "Midrash" which has misled some people to think that Chazal wrote about this reasoning. In actuality, the "Midrash" quoted is a "Midrash Lekach Tov". The Midrash Lekach Tov is certainly a legitimate rabbinic source, but it was written by Tuvia ben Eliezer in the 11th century and is therefore from the period of the Rishonim. He does indeed write this reasoning in his commentary to Leviticus 18:22.

Those of you that followed my blog series on masturbation and "wasting seed" would already be familiar with the myriads of situations in which the rabbis not only permit but encourage heterosexual intercourse even when procreation is not involved. It seems that they clearly understood the value of sexual activity between loving partners as something productive in and of itself. This leads one to question the logic of this reasoning. Nonetheless, it appears all over the literature.

It is Disgusting

In the second part of the Sefer HaChinuch I quoted above, and in the quotation from Rav Feinstein I quoted in an earlier post, it becomes clear that many Rabbis simply thought that homosexual sex was wrong for no reason other than that they felt it was "disgusting". The term abomination was therefore very easy for them to understand. I am not going to delve into this body of literature too much, as it is self-explanatory. It is also clear that the Rabbis who held this opinion were heterosexuals themselves, and therefore could not fathom why homosexual activity would be attractive to anyone. I do want to comment that clearly Rabbi Yehuda HaNassi in the story we quoted from Nedarim above, did not feel that way, otherwise it would make no sense that the translation of the word "To'eva" would be such a challenge for him.

In addition, I would very highly recommend that the readers of this blog take a look at Rabbi Greenberg's book, "Wrestling with God and Men" and particularly at chapter 7, "The Queer Middle Ages". In this chapter he quotes poems and writing from numerous Rabbinic greats in which they expressed homosexual longings that are quite intense and explicit. These include some of the greatest poets of Jewish history, many of whom authored much of our liturgy and zemirot. These include Rabbi Moshe ibn Ezra, Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi and many more. While there is no evidence that any of them ever had homosexual intercourse, it is very clear that they did not see it as "disgusting". They clearly saw it as something beautiful. They clearly understood why Rabbi Yehuda HaNassi had such a hard time with the term "To'eva" as it related to homosexuality.

Nonetheless, the "disgusting" argument, or the "abomination" argument, has appeared all over the place in the Rishonim and Acharonim. It is difficult to debate a "reason" that is not stated with any form of logic, and it simply is so because people said so.

Other Reasons

I don't want to spend too much time on all of these, but they deserve some "honorable" mention. Many have argued that homosexual sex in "unnatural" and does not occur in nature. This is a highly dubious claim that is refuted by much evidence from other species. But even if it wasn't refuted by such evidence, it is still questionable. Lots of things we do are "unnatural". We fast on Yom Kippur, and I am not aware of any animal on the planet that deliberately goes hungry. Regardless, this argument pops up quite a bit as well. Other arguments include promiscuity and sexually transmitted infections. These were especially popular in the 1980's. The promiscuity argument though has been mentioned in earlier rabbinic literature as well. This also does not fly in our times when the discussion is about the appropriateness of a loving relationship between two males. Furthermore, promiscuity is certainly not the exclusive domain of homosexuals.

At this point, it is time to move on to an understanding of the verses in Leviticus that leads one to believe that the Torah is speaking of something specific. This will involve some historical analysis, textual analysis, and sociological analysis. I am going to reveal up front, that I personally find these arguments to be quite compelling, in fact I believe them to be at least close to the "Amito shel Torah" - the true meaning of the Torah. However, Orthodox Judaism believes in Torah Sheba'al peh. Fundamentally that means that in Halachic matters, we interpret the meaning of Biblical verses according to the way the Rabbis of the Talmud and Mishna taught us.

This is why we don't eat cheeseburgers, even though the verses teach us about kids in their mother goat's milk. This is why we fast on Yom Kippur instead of whip ourselves. etc. etc. So even if I am convinced that Rabbi Greenberg's interpretation of the verses sounds true to me, I cannot make that the basis of Halachic interpretation unless we can viably and realistically explain that Chazal also understood the pesukim that way. So far, we have seen that Chazal have interpreted that the Torah is prohibiting penetrative intercourse between two males. We have seen that Chazal understood the reasoning of this prohibition to be "To'eh atta bah" but have not really figured out what that means. We have seen that Chazal in the Sifra wrote that the marriage practices of the Egyptians are abominable, as they marry a man to another man, a woman to another woman, and a man to a woman and her daughter, and a woman to two men.

In order for Rabbi Greenberg's ideas to be considered within the acceptable halachic discourse of Orthodoxy, he must do more than give a convincing reading of the pasuk, he must convince us that his reading is at least consistent with the way Chazal understood the prohibition.

I know that it is not fair to mention a critique of Rabbi Greenberg's work before I even begin discussing his ideas.  But I will do it anyway.  Check this review here of Rabbi Greenberg's work written by Rabbi Asher Lopatin, a well known modern Orthodox Rabbi.  Rabbi Lopatin points out the flaw in Rabbi Greenberg's work, in that although sounds really good, it hasn't met the standards of what would be considered Orthodox.

The problem is that many modern Orthodox Rabbis like Rabbi Lopatin would love to be able to endorse these ideas, but they can't because Rabbi Greenberg has still failed to take the step necessary to make his ideas Halachically acceptable. Not that this is his fault, because it is not an easy step to take. I don't know if I will be successful either, but I will try at least to show how it might be done.  The purpose of this blog is to solve these issues by remaining within the bounds of Halachah.  That will always remain my mission, and if it doesn't work, I will just acknowledge that and keep studying.

Sorry for keeping you in suspense.  In the next post we will begin an anlysis of Rabbi Greenberg and those who follow in similar paths.