Does the Torah Actually Prohibit all Homosexual Intercourse?

I apologize for the time lapse between this post and my last one.  Honestly, I have been thinking about and reading about and studying this issue for quite some time.  Since we are about to read the portion of Leviticus this week  in synagogue that is the center of this discussion, I decided it was time to release this post.  I hope that all of my readers are willing to join me on this journey through a very challenging subject.  Those of you that have been following me for the last ten years have learned that this blog is not designed for those people who like to read a rant in which I express an opinion and throw around a few things to support my opinion.  You can go to FaceBook for that.  I will take the time necessary to take apart an issue from beginning to end, even if that takes several years and a lot of work.  More importantly, even if it means finding out that my preconceived ideas were completely wrong. 

We established in previous posts here that the prohibition in Leviticus 18 and 20 prohibits penetrative anal intercourse between two males.  We also wrote that this was how Chazal understood this prohibition, and how it was interpreted by Halachic authorities ever since.  Presumably, this would mean that if two adult men, both of whom are gay, had a consensual, loving, and committed long-term relationship, that sexual intercourse would be forbidden.

In chapter 13 of his book, Rabbi Steven Greenberg presents an analysis of the verses in Vayikra.  Many other scholars have made similar analyses over the years, and I cannot review all of them and their arguments.  I had to pick one, so I picked Rabbi Greenberg.  Very similar ideas were also presented in a famous (or infamous, depending on your perspective) speech given by Rabbi Joseph Dweck in May 2017.  He presented almost the same ideas but stopped short of claiming that we should apply these ideas in practical Halacha.  You can see his lecture here. I will present his basic argument, and then analyze if we can practically apply them and remain within the bounds of accepted Orthodox Halacha. 

I am aware that an exact definition of the term "accepted Orthodox Halacha" is not so easy to find. Please allow me to define it the way I understand it for the purposes of this blog.  Orthodox Halacha means that we interpret the Torah She'beKtav (the written Torah) according to the way that Chazal (the rabbis of the Mishna and Talmud) taught us in the Torah She'be'al Peh (the oral Torah).  If Chazal tell us how to interpret a verse in the Torah and then teach us practical Halacha on that basis, Orthodoxy demands that we follow that interpretation.  While it is true that there are "Shivim Panim La'Torah" (seventy "faces" - potential interpretations) to the Torah, we cannot decide on our own that we can change practical Halacha if it means interpreting a verse in the Torah in a manner expressly different from the way it was interpreted by Chazal. 

I will present Rabbi Greenberg’s argument as a series of points rather than by developing his entire narrative. If you want to see his entire argument, please see his book. These points are meant to read as a progression of arguments and observations leading to a conclusion. The numbering is not random. Forgive me please if I am oversimplifying his ideas. I ask his forgiveness in advance if I misrepresent his ideas, though I do think I do a pretty decent job summarizing them.  My goal is to present what is necessary for the purposes of my halachic discussion on this blog.  

1. In ancient societies, penetrative sex was perpetrated by the powerful against the weak. It was a demonstration of dominance over the weaker or younger party, and it was humiliating. (Such practices still exist of course, for a graphic and contemporary example, think of those prisoners who abuse other prisoners by sexually assaulting them. They are usually not homosexual predators; they are just predators)
2. Sadly, women were considered inferior, and the fact that men penetrate women during intercourse was seen as a way of showing domination. The domination of male over female was an integral part of the institution of marriage in much of the ancient world. 
3. Men who were on the receiving end of such intercourse were looked upon as if they were like women, in the sense that they were inferior and somehow beneath the "dominant" penetrator. In many ways, they were seen as if they had made themselves "like women". This was like willingly accepting an inferior and degraded status.
4. Homosexual relationships, in the sense of two men who were committed to each other in bonds of love and respect were just "not a thing" in those days. 
5. The verses in Leviticus are written in the context of other prohibitions against incest. By its' very definition, incest is an act in which someone abuses the trust that one has in a family member. The vulnerability of someone dependent on his/her family while a family member dominates and degrades the victim, is well understood by modern psychologists. The victim is typically helpless and has nowhere to turn, as the people who are supposed to protect them are the perpetrators. 
6. In this context, it makes sense that the Torah prohibits male/male intercourse as it is degrading to the victim, and even the willing victim is guilty of allowing himself to be degraded in a way unbecoming of God's creation.
7. When the Torah writes that one may not "lie with a man" it was already obvious that the intent was to prohibit penetrative intercourse, as this is what it always means and what it meant in every other verse. 
8. The only reason the Torah needed to add the term "as one lies with a woman" is to tell us that it is this type of denigrative and abusive penetrative sex that is prohibited between males. This would not apply to a loving, consensual, long-term relationship between two homosexual males. 

The attractiveness of accepting this as the reading of the verse is obvious. It would end our conundrum with which I began this blog thread.  It would both leave the prohibition of Leviticus intact, while still allowing for sexual activity between two gay and committed men. But can this be acceptable halachically? Does this violate the rule that we cannot interpret a verse contrary to the interpretation of Chazal when it changes practical Halacha?

I will henceforth refer to the type of intercourse prohibited by the Torah according to rabbi Greenberg as "humiliative", and the type of intercourse that would be permitted as "relationship".

The truth is that this interpretation of the verse feels forced.  I have always read the verse my entire life the standard way and concluded that the Torah prohibits male/male penetrative intercourse, period.  Every time I have read the sugyot in Shas, I assumed that Chazal read it this way as well.  Clearly, the poskim throughout history understood it this way.  I asked myself to play a thought experiment.  What if I had been taught Rabbi Greenberg's interpretation of the verses from childhood, how would I have learned the sugyot in shas?  What if I lived in a society like the one I just described in ancient times?  What if I had always assumed that what God found abhorrent was humiliative intercourse between men? Is it possible that Chazal really also understood it this way, and that if I started with a different idea of the meaning of the verse, maybe I would have read the gemara differently too? 

I am virtually certain that this post will be misunderstood by some readers, so I am going to try to be very clear about what I am about to do in this post:

1. The verses in Leviticus have been understood throughout the Halachic literature to be referring to all types of homosexual male/male penetrative intercourse
2. The poskim read both the Torah and Chazal with the above assumption intact
3. Rabbi Greenberg suggested that the Torah was only referring to humiliative, and not relationship intercourse (my terms, not his)
4. If Chazal interpreted the verse to be referring to all types of male/male intercourse, then we cannot as Orthodox Jews accept Rabbi Greenberg's suggestion, no matter how much we may want to
5. Is it possible that we have read Chazal incorrectly as well? Maybe Chazal also understood the verses to be referring only to humiliative intercourse?
6. If we can demontstrate that the above assumption is even possible, then although Rabbi Greenberg's suggestion certainly goes against many centuries of Halachic understanding, but it isn't completely outside of the Orthodox range of possibilites

The rest of this post will be discussing this one problem only. That is the question of whether it is possible that we have been reading Chazal wrong for all these years.  I am only asking if it is possible, not if it is true or not. There are many other issues that will be dealt with in future posts. Please bear in mind that this will be an exceptionally long journey. I beg the reader to allow me the opportunity to go through this process before you think you know what my conclusions will be. Here goes: 

In our previous discussion, we brought two Talmudic sources, one from Yevamot and one from Sanhedrin, which established that Chazal understood the prohibition of leviticus to be referring to penetrative intercourse between males.  Chazal certainly do not point out this differentiation between two types of male/male intercourse (which I will now refer to as "humiliative" versus "relationship" intercourse).  However, let's assume for the moment that Chazal understood it as a given that the male/male intercourse being prohibited was humiliative, as we described above.

While this may seem surprising to many of us at first, let me present the following analysis of every known reference in the Talmud regarding homosexuality.  I want to see if it is possible that Chazal, when they wrote of this prohibition, only meant humiliative intercourse.  If it is plausible, then Rabbi Greenberg's theory might be able to remain within the bounds of Orthodox halacha.  If not, then no matter how nice his explanation sounds, it cannot be considered acceptable within Orthodoxy.

Berachot 43b

Six things are disgraceful for a Torah scholar: He may not go out perfumed into the marketplace; he may not go out of his house alone at night; he may not go out wearing patched shoes; he may not converse with a woman in the marketplace; he may not recline and participate in a meal in the company of ignoramuses; and he may not be the last to enter the study hall. And some say that he may not take long strides and he may not walk with an upright posture. The Gemara elaborates on the statements of the baraita. He may not go out perfumed into the marketplace; Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This prohibition only applies in a place where they are suspected of homosexuality. One who goes out into the marketplace perfumed, will arouse suspicion. Rav Sheshet said: We only said this with regard to his clothing that was perfumed, but with regard to his body, it is permitted, as his sweat causes the fragrance to dissipate. Rav Pappa said: In this regard, his hair is considered like his clothing. And some say: His hair is considered like his body.

Based on the context, the reason for the prohibition against a Torah Scholar going out perfumed in the marketplace, is that people may suspect that his intent is to engage in homosexual acts.  One wonders why Chazal were not concerned that he may be suspected of illicit heterosexual acts?  The next prohibition, going out alone at night, is prohibited due to this very same reason. The perfume, however, is by nature meant to attract others.  One might explain, that for someone about to engage in an exploitative activity, such as to hire a prostitute (and presumably to penetrate her sexually and exploit her vulnerability and need for money), which is what one is suspect of going out alone at night, he need not attract attention to himself.  However, if one wants to be receptive and allow another to penetrate him, he will want to make himself attractive by perfuming himself. 

 

This is by no means a definitive proof, but making oneself receptive to intercourse and allowing oneself to be humiliated in such a way (remember that this is how receptive male/male intercourse was viewed in the contemporary society) would be exactly the type of intercourse forbidden by the Torah.  The type of intercourse one attracts by wandering around the marketplace is not the type of loving, consensual intercourse that we are calling relationship intercourse.  So is it at least possible so far that Chazal understood the prohibition against male/male intercourse to be referring only to humiliative intercourse? Yes, so far it is at least possible. 

Kiddushin 82a

MISHNA: A bachelor may not act as a teacher of children, nor may a woman act as a teacher of children. Rabbi Elazar says: Even one who does not have a wife may not act as a teacher of children. Rabbi Yehuda says: A bachelor may not herd cattle, nor may two bachelors sleep with one covering, lest they transgress the prohibition against homosexual intercourse, but the Rabbis permit it. GEMARA: What is the reason that a bachelor may not teach children? If we say it is due to the children themselves, that it is suspected that he may engage in homosexual intercourse with them, but isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 5:10): They said to Rabbi Yehuda: Jews are not suspected of engaging in homosexual intercourse nor of engaging in intercourse with an animal. Rather, the reason is as follows: A bachelor may not be a teacher of children due to the mothers of the children, who come to the school from time to time, with whom he might sin. Similarly, a woman may not serve as a teacher to children because she may come to be secluded with the fathers of the children. The mishna teaches that Rabbi Elazar says: Even one who does not have a wife may not act as a teacher of children. A dilemma was raised before the students in the study hall: Does Rabbi Elazar mean one who does not have a wife at all, or perhaps he is referring even to one who has a wife, in a circumstance where she is not residing with him? Come and hear: Even one who has a wife but she is not residing with him may not act as a teacher of children. This statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and indicates that his restriction applies even if the man is married.

Here we have several important statements which require analysis.  First there is the discussion regarding two men sleeping with the same blanket. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits it, as he is concerned that they may transgress the sin of homosexual intercourse. The Chachamim are not concerned about this, and they allow it. Is Rabbi Yehuda concerned about humiliative intercourse or relationship intercourse? There is no way to prove either way, but it is certainly plausible that Rabbi Yehuda was concerned that one of the men might take advantage of the other and engage in humiliative penetration. So, it remains at least possible that Chazal only prohibited humiliative intercourse.  

The Chachamim were not concerned about this, why? Perhaps it is because humilative intercourse would require that one man subordinate himself to the other and that this is not so likely? Maybe people are not generally suspected of allowing themselves to be abused (at least in situations where is there is no power differential between the two)?  I don't know for sure, but it remains a possibility. 

The second statement is the prohibition of an unmarried person, or according to Rabbi Eliezer even a married man whose wife is not living with him, from being a teacher of children. By its' very definition, this Chazal is discussing a prohibition of humiliative and exploitative sex between an adult and a child. This is obvious and requires no further discussion.  This is definitely prohibited by the Torah according to any reading of the verses. 

Sukkah 29a

The Sages taught that on account of four matters the sun is eclipsed: On account of a president of the court who dies and is not eulogized appropriately, and the eclipse is a type of eulogy by Heaven; on account of a betrothed young woman who screamed in the city that she was being raped and there was no one to rescue her; on account of homosexuality; and on account of two brothers whose blood was spilled as one.

The context of this Gemara would clearly suggest that the homosexuality for which the world is punished is humiliative and exploitative.  The other examples are the rape of a young girl, murder, and disrespect of the dead.  It would certainly fit the pattern if Chazal were discussing humiliative homosexual intercourse. 

Pesachim 91a

Rav Ukva questioned this answer and said to him: Do we make a group that is entirely composed of women? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: We do not make a group for a Paschal lamb that consists of women, slaves, and minors. What, is the mishna not referring to forming a group that is composed exclusively of women by themselves and slaves by themselves and minors by themselves? Rava said to him: No, the mishna is referring only to forming a group that is composed of women and slaves and minors together, but a group composed exclusively of women, or slaves, or minors would be permitted. It is prohibited to form a group containing both women and slaves, due to a concern that it may lead to frivolity. It is prohibited to form a group of minors and slaves, due to a concern that it may lead to promiscuity, i.e., homosexual behavior. 

For starters, slaves (with the obvious exception of children), are the group that in these ancient societies were the most vulnerable to being the recipients of humiliative sexual penetration.  Furthermore, including them in groups specifically with children would put the children at risk in a very vulnerable environment.  This clearly fits the pattern of humiliative intercourse, and thus would support the idea that Chazal considered the prohibition to be that of humiliative intercourse. 

Chulin 92b

Ulla says: These are the thirty mitzvot that the descendants of Noah initially accepted upon themselves; but they fulfill only three of them. One of these three mitzvot is that they do not write a marriage contract for a wedding between two males; although they violate the prohibition against engaging in homosexuality, they are not so brazen as to write a marriage contract as for a regular marriage.

This Gemara is consistent with the Sifra that we quoted in our previous post here.  I will discuss this Gemara in a later post when I discuss the prohibition against marriage between males.  We will get there, but please forgive me for postponing that discussion.

Sanhedrin 54a

On this page there are two discussions that are relevant.  The first is the discussion regarding one who has penetrative intercourse with his father or uncle. There is much discussion back and forth about this in the beginning of this page of Talmud, and since the details are not relevant for this discussion, I refer you to the Talmud for the specific quotes.  What is important for our discussion is the assumption that one who sexually penetrates his male family member violates both the prohibitions of incest AND that of homosexuality.  In all relationships involving incest, modern scholarship has taught us that there is always an exploitation of trust and abuse involved.  While typically the father or uncle is the perpetrator and not the recipient, one can imagine situations in which the son or nephew would be in the position to exploit the older generation.  This certainly is an example of Chazal discussing humiliative intercourse as the type of intercourse prohibited by the Torah. 

The second discussion on this page, is the mishna we quoted in our previous post here.  This Mishna lists together penetrative intercourse with a male human being and with an animal. The context would suggest that we are discussing humiliative and abusive intercourse, similar to that which occurs with an animal who has no ability to choose for herself and is abused by her master.  While obviously this list could simply be listing these two together as they have the same punishment, clearly there is no indication from this Chazal that understood the verse in Leviticus to be referring to relationship intercourse.  If anything, it suggests the opposite. 

Sanhedrin 55a

Rav Aḥadevoi bar Ami asked Rav Sheshet: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of homosexual intercourse on himself, what is the halakha? Is he liable for homosexual intercourse? Rav Sheshet said to him: You disgust me with your question; such an act is not possible.Rav Ashi said: What is your dilemma? With regard to doing so with an erect penis, you cannot find such a case. You can find it only when one performs this act of intercourse with a flaccid penis. And the halakha is subject to a dispute: According to the one who says that a man who engages in intercourse with a flaccid penis, with one of those with whom relations are forbidden, is exempt, as that is not considered intercourse, here too, when one does so to himself, he is exempt. And according to the one who says that he is liable, he is rendered liable here for transgressing two prohibitions according to Rabbi Yishmael; he is rendered liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse actively, and he is rendered liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse passively.

This passage is probably the most difficult one so far to explain according to Rabbi Greenberg's hypothesis.  If indeed Chazal truly understood that the only homosexual intercourse prohibited by the Torah is humiliative, then why prohibit "intercourse" with oneself?  One interesting thing to note about this very strange passage, is that there is no pleasure involved in this act, as the Gemara states that the penis is not erect when this is being done. If this was just a strange form of masturbation, then maybe it would not be prohibited at all by the Torah. So why prohibit this? The answer to this question may lead us to the explanation we are seeking.  Perhaps this is being performed for others in some perverse pornographic presentation? If so, would it not be possible that the person he is humiliating is himself?  If so, then this passage also would not contradict the possibility that Chazal as well understood that the intercourse prohibited by Leviticus is only humiliative intercourse.  

Sanhedrin 73a

MISHNA: And these are the ones who are saved from transgressing even at the cost of their lives; that is to say, these people may be killed so that they do not perform a transgression: One who pursues another to kill him, or pursues a male to sodomize him, or pursues a betrothed young woman to rape her. But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives.

This mishna clearly is referring to abusive and humiliative penetrative intercourse, by its very definition. Again, their isn't much to discuss here, as one man is chasing another to harm him.  The Mishna openly compares this to rape of a woman and even murder.  

Sanhedrin 58a

“And shall cleave to his wife,” but not to a male; such a relationship is not defined as cleaving. “To his wife,” but not to the wife of another man. “And they shall be one flesh” indicates that he should marry one of those with whom he can become one flesh, i.e., they can bear children together. This excludes domesticated and undomesticated animals, with which one is prohibited from engaging in bestiality, as they do not become one flesh. All these are forbidden to the descendants of Noah.

Here Chazal seem to be suggesting that the mitzvah to marry applies only to (marrying) a woman, and not to a man.  In the context of this statement, it is not referring to the prohibition of adultery or bestiality per se, but it is saying that a relationship of "cleaving" does not happen between men, or between humans and animals, or with another's wife.  In other words, this statement of Chazal is an observation regarding reality.  A meaningful relationship can only occur between a man, and his own wife.   The contradiction here is then one between our modern observation, which is that some men sometimes do "cleave" to one another and form a bond and relationship.  This would go under the category often discussed in Rationalist Judaic circles.  What does one do when a statement of Chazal is contradicted by modern science or by modern experience?  I do not want to go down that "rabbit hole" right now. 

However, if one compares it to the context, the other relationships listed are prohibited relationships.  Does this prove that Chazal viewed all homosexual penetrative intercourse as prohibited by the verses in Leviticus including what we are calling relationship intercourse?  Not really.  Firstly, this verse is not discussing a prohibition, which we mentioned above.  Secondly, this Aggadic observation of Chazal that two men cannot "cleave" to one another and develop a bond may not be true, it may simply be what they believed to be true at the time.  If you are of the school that believes that what I just said is blasphemous (because whatever Chazal stated is 100% true), then I would still argue that a psychological observation about who develops relationships does not necessarily create a Torah prohibition. 

One could argue that Chazal certainly knew of loving and intimate relationships between two men (think of David and Jonathan). However, they still would have illustrated their example of “cleaving” to one another by saying that this is the type of bond that exists between a man and his wife, and not between two men. Rabbi Greenberg’s entire argument depends on the idea that at the time of Chazal, when one mentioned a homosexual relationship between men, the image conjured in the minds of Chazal was that of a humiliative relationship, and not a loving and committed relationship between equals. 

Sanhedrin 82a

Rav then remembered that which he learned through tradition and said: “Judah has dealt treacherously,” this is a reference to the sin of idol worship. And likewise it says: But as a wife who treacherously departs her husband, you have dealt treacherously with Me, house of Israel, says the Lord (Jeremiah 3:20). “And an abomination is committed in Israel and in Jerusalem,” this is a reference to male homosexual intercourse, and likewise it says: “You shall not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; it is an abomination”

The context here, again, is one of rebelliousness and violence.  It continues with a criticism of prostitution, which also fits into the category of abusive crimes.  This is certainly consistent with humiliative homosexual intercourse. 

Yevamot 53b

Ravina raised before Rava: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with another male, what is the halakha? Is it considered to be a forbidden act of homosexual intercourse? The Gemara is puzzled by this dilemma: With regard to a male, it is written explicitly: “You shall not lie with a man as with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22), which indicates that anything considered an act of sexual intercourse with a woman is also considered an act of sexual intercourse with a man.  

We quoted this gemara in an earlier post because the Gemara is clearly defining the prohibited act as one of penetrative intercourse between males.  However, this passage does not indicate to us whether Chazal are discussing humiliative or relationship intercourse.  It could easily be referring to either type. 

Nedarim 51a

Bar Kappara said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi at the wedding: What is the meaning of the word to’eva, abomination, used by the Torah to describe homosexual intercourse (see Leviticus 18:22)? Whatever it was that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to bar Kappara in explanation, claiming that this is the meaning of to’eva, bar Kappara refuted it by proving otherwise. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: You explain it. Bar Kappara said to him: Let your wife come and pour me a goblet of wine. She came and poured him wine. Bar Kappara then said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Arise and dance for me, so that I will tell you the meaning of the word: This is what the Merciful One is saying in the Torah in the word to’eva: You are straying after it [to’e ata bah], i.e., after an atypical mate

This sugya is interesting on many levels.  The quotation above is from the translation available on Sefaria.org (as are most of my quotations unless I specifically say otherwise).  On Sefaria, the bold letters are the translation, and the regular letters are filled in to allow the reader to make sense of what he is reading.  The assumption that the word To'eva in the interchange recorded is referring to the word as it is used to describe homosexual intercourse is consistent with the standard commentaries.  But this is by no means necessary.  In fact, it may well be that it is referring to other uses of the same word (such as Devarim 27:15 where it refers to idol worship).  It is quite likely that the Gemara is referring to the widespread use of the word in Tanakh.  If so, Bar Kappara is simply teaching us that the root of the word To'eva, is the Hebrew word to'eh, which means to go astray or to wander.  Thus, the teaching would be that anything that leads one astray or is a fundamental behavior or idea opposed to God's true will as expressed in the Torah is a To'eva.  This would be entirely consistent with the idea that humiliative intercourse is a To'eva. 

Kereitot 3a

The Gemara suggests: And if you would say the entire mishna is in fact in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and with regard to the halakha listed in the first clause he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that is not tenable, as doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: In the case of a male who engages in intercourse with another male, and a male who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, who derives these prohibitions from two separate verses, from: “And you shall not lie with a man as with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22), and from: “There shall not be a sodomite of the sons of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18), which is referring to one who engages in homosexual intercourse passively, one who transgresses both of these prohibitions in a single lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin offerings

The Sefaria translation translates the Hebrew word "kadesh" as a sodomite.  This is not the best translation.  Most commentators understand a "Kadesh" to be a man who sets himself aside as a receptive male prostitute.  This would be one who humiliates himself by being available for men to penetrate, either for money, or for some cultic practice. This gemara is very consistent with the idea that when the Talmud discusses "mishkav zachar", it is referring to humiliative intercourse. 

I think I have covered the entire Talmud Bavli.  If I left something out please let me know in the comments.

What I have established in this post is this: IF one would assume that Rabbi Greenberg's reading of the verses in Leviticus are correct, and IF one therefore assumes that the Torah differentiates between two categories of male/male intercourse (one forbidden and one permitted), then we have no proof so far from CHAZAL that they understood it any differently.  Chazal could theoretically be interpreted to have understood the verses this way, in concert with the environment within which they lived.  I completely and totally understand that this is not what the poskim understood or thought when they learned those Sugyot in the Gemara.  I absolutely understand that the rishonim and Acharonim did not understand Chazal this way.  However, we cannot say at this point that Rabbi Greenberg's interpretation is against Chazal's. What we can say is that he and those who write similar ideas are interpreting both Chazal and Leviticus very differently from how Poskim throughout the centuries have. But this is no surprise, as they readily would admit this. 

I have deliberately left the discussion of the meaning of Chazal's negative statements regarding marriages between members of the same gender for a later post.  We will get there. 

There are many more halachic issues we identified with male/male intercourse in our previous post.  We must analyze these prohibitions as well.  Lo Tikrevu, Hotza'at zera and some major Halachic disagreements among the Rishonim must be discussed.  For example, is it possible to have an act which can be prohibited or permited based on context alone, while on the surface the act itself is the same? Even if it is possible to claim that Chazal also understood the prohibition of mishkav zachar to be a prohibition against humiliative sex, is it legitimate to negate virtually the entire corpus of post-Talmudic Halachic literature?  Does a situation of great need allow us to do something like that?   

Another area that needs to be mentioned is the oft-quoted claim that, when the need was great, the Rabbis have so frequently found ways to "permit" things that by the Torah should have been prohibited.  These claims often arise when discussing this topic as well. The examples invariably include the use of the "pruzbul" to allow for collecting on debt after the sabbatical year ("shemita"), the use of a "heter iska" to allow for borrowing and lending money with interest, selling chametz for pesach and other cases.  

However, the difference between our case and these other cases should be obvious.  In all of those cases (each one has its own halachic history and rationale) no one ever disputed the plain meaning of the commandement in the Torah.  The meaning of the verses remained as they were understood by Chazal.  Those "loopholes" were created to deal with an extenuating need not by changing our understanding of the Torah, but by finding some legalistic trick to get around the law.  If one wanted to oppose such a law, he/she would state that the rabbinic trick was violating the purpose and intent of the Torah.  That would be a legitimate point to which the rabbis would respond that there was an extenuating circumstance.

Our case is very different though, in that Rabbi Greenberg is claiming that the Torah law itself has been misinterpreted for millenia.  I am suggesting here that if Rabbi Greenberg is claiming that Chazal themselves misinterpreted the verses, than this idea cannot be considered within Orthodox Halachic tradition.  On the other hand, if he is claiming that Chazal also understood it this way, then we can continue the discussion and try to clarify a long list of other issues to see if there is any viability to this suggestion.

I also anticipate that I may have missed some statements in the Bavli that my readers will bring to my attention.  So we still have a very long way to go ... I may dig up some more statements in the Yerushalmi or other Beraitot (Rabbinic statements not in the Mishna) that will need to be explained.  Please feel free to email, or preferably, comment in the comment section if you find any statements that are relevant and I missed.